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JOHN MARSHALL, McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND, AND "WE
THE PEOPLE": REVISIONS IN NEED OF REVISING'
MARTIN S. FLAHERTY*
John Marshall may not have been Shakespeare, but he remains
our closest judicial equivalent. Two hundred years after his rise to
Chief Justice, no American jurist remains so studied, interpreted,
reinterpreted, debated, and invoked.2 Even debates about the twists
and inevitability of Marshall's reputation have Shakespearean
counterparts.3 In one further parallel, the work of each writer
furnishes a wealth of quotations that are so entrenched in their
respective cultures that it is often forgotten that each writer
provided the sources in the first place-at least, that is, until they
are reencountered at symposia such as this. As with Shakespeare's
"major" plays, this last phenomenon is especially true of Marshall's
"great" cases such as Marbury v. Madison4 and McCulloch v.
Maryland,5 several passages from which have literally been carved
* Professor of Law & Codirector, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human
Rights, Fordham Law School. My thanks to Lance Banning, R.B. Bernstein, Chris
Eisgruber, Abner Greene, Charles Hobson, Larry Kramer, John Murrin, Jack Rakove, Paul
Schwartz, and Bill Treanor, for conversations, comments, and suggestions. My thanks as
well to Cam Hirsch, Rebecca Misner, and Annie Tsai for research assistance.
1. Cf Edmund S. Morgan, The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising, 14
WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 3 (1957).
2. For examples of this concededly impressionistic assertion, see such bicentennial
commentary as Symposium, Chief Justice John Marshall and the United States Supreme
Court, 1801-1835, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743 (2000), Symposium, John Marshall, 17 ST.
JoHN's J. LEGAL COMIIENT. (forthcoming 2002), and of course, Symposium, The Legacy of
Chief Justice John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321 (2002). See also Christopher L.
Eisgruber, John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 439 (analyzing the force
of Marshall's prose). For a dissenting view on Marshall's literary strengths, see Larry D.
Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (2001).
3. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1399
(2002). For a leading challenge to the inevitability of Shakespeare's reputation, see GARY
TAYLOR, RENVENTING SHAKESPEARE: A CULTURAL HISTORY, FROM THE RESTORATIONTO THE
PRESENT (1989). But see RICHARDA. POSNER, CAwDOzo:ASTUDYINREPUTATION 62-64 (1990)
(challenging the notion that Shakespeare's reputation is purely accidental).
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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in stone as reminders at the justices' version of "poet's corner" in
the crypt-like basement of the Supreme Court.
One passage from McCulloch, too long to carve, famously raises
an issue that is not logically necessary to any part of the opinion,
but which nonetheless poses perhaps the most basic question of
constitutional law:
In discussing this question [concerning the constitutionality of
the Bank of the United States], the counsel for the state of
Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the
construction of the constitution, to consider that instrument, not
as emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign and
independent states.6
Employing the type of understatement that reflects utter certainty,
Marshall had no doubt about the answer:
It would be difficult to sustain this proposition.... From these
conventions [held in the states], the constitution derives its
whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the
people; is "ordained and established," in the name of the people;
and is declared to be ordained, "in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure
the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity." The
assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied, in
calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the
people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject
it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and
could not be negatived, by the state governments. The
constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and
bound the state sovereignties.7
Within the legal world, Marshall's ostensibly nationalistic
analysis has been taken to mean pretty much what it appears to
say. As one commentator puts it, "To Marshall, the sovereign was
hardly the states-it was 'We the People.' It was 'We the People'
who ordained and established the Constitution, not 'We the
6. Id. at 402.
7. Id. at 403-04.
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States.'"8 This view by definition denies that the Constitution
resulted from an agreement or compact among the states. The
usual-and critical-corollary that follows holds that the national
populace erred on the side of according power to the national
government at the expense of the states, as McCulloch appears to
indicate. At the very least, the idea of a unitary founding people has
given rise to a presumption that federal rather than state claims
should prevail in areas of modern constitutional controversy.9
These nationalistic readings of Marshall in turn corresponded
with a nationalistic interpretation of the Founding itself. Never, in
fact, had Marshall's apparent views appeared more solid than in
light of historical scholarship of the past few generations, including
pathbreaking work by Bernard Bailyn, Lance Banning, Forrest
McDonald, Edmund S. Morgan, Jack Rakove, John Phillip Reid,
and Gordon Wood, to name a few.'0 This work in particular has
done much to recapture the Founding's understandings-indeed,
reinvention-of popular sovereignty and the national government.
Almost any historian who ventured into the world of law and
encountered Marshall's account would likely have viewed it as a
sort of Emanuel's version of recent historiography-a bit too
simplified, perhaps, but user-friendly and essentially right.
Recently, however, all this has come under challenge. Ironically,
revisionism has issued less from law schools or history depart-
ments" than from Marshall's own former home at the Supreme
8. Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and the Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1113, 1150 (2001); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth
Amendment's Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47,66 (1995) ("Marshall treated the American
people as a single entity incapable of making a binding agreement with itself.").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 38-61.
10. Essential works in this literature include: BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF
LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1995); FORREST
MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1985); EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTINGTHE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMIERICA (1988); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS
IN THE MAKING OFTHE CONSTITUTION (1996); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THEAMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). For a historiographical overview,
see Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 523, 535-56 (1995).
11. But see FORRESTMcDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUMIVIMPERIO,
1776-1976, at 7-26 (2000).
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Court itself. The past decade's well known "federalism", or "states'
rights,"2 cases have proceeded in lockstep with accounts about the
nation's origins that are almost as state-oriented as the results they
announce. More nuanced though nonetheless state-oriented claims
have in the meantime come from important scholars."3 At its most
unconventional, the case law in particular asserts the proposition
that it really was "the states, in their sovereign capacity," that
established the Constitution. With this alternative creation myth
comes an alternative presumption against controverted assertions
of federal power and for claims of state privilege. 4
This trend has gone so far that one Justice has attempted to lay
claim to Marshall himself. Not long ago, Justice Thomas forcefully
argued that both a closer and more contextual reading of McCulloch
reveals that Marshall's identification of the popular sovereign
was not so nationalistic as legend has it.'5 On his view, not only is
the conventional account of the Founding wrong, but so too is
equating that account with John Marshall. Despite McCulloch's
own nationalistic result, moreover, Thomas and his fellow dis-
senters cash out Marshall's position on the creators of the
Constitution to further support an interpretive presumption for
state rather than Federal authority. Thomas's reinterpretation fell
just one vote shy of becoming the modern Supreme Court's
understanding of the Marshall Court's understanding of who
established and, ordained the Constitution. The state-oriented
presumption that Thomas's reinterpretation inevitably furthers,
however, survives and thrives in the Court's continuing line of
"states' rights" decisions.' 6
This Article argues that this latest attempt to revise Marshall
is wrong for the right reasons. Against the conventional wisdom,
12. For now, I note only that I employ the term "states' rights" more for its popular
currency than for its theoretical accuracy. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?
Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277 (1999).
Charles Black correctly pointed out that "rights" are more appropriately attributed to
individuals than governmental units. See CHARLES BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM:
HUMAN RIGHTs, NAMED AND UNNAMED 41-85 (1997).
13. HenryPaul Monaghan, We thePeoples], Original Understanding, and Constitutional
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 121 (1996).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 38-61.
15. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,849 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 38-61.
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Justice Thomas not only correctly reads Marshall as resisting the
idea that a single, consolidated American people created the
Constitution, but that he actually fails to do justice to his own
thesis. That said, Thomas and his fellow revisionists still err in
concluding that the less-nationalistic creation myth that results
presumptively benefits the state governments rather than federal
authority. As if all this were not counterintuitive enough, this
Article finally suggests that the general Founding understanding
of who created the Constitution may well prove to be closer to the
nationalist misunderstanding of Marshall's position than to his
actual, more state-oriented beliefs.
Part I provides the modern and analytic background. It begins by
demonstrating how determining just who the founding popular
sovereign was has become nearly as important now as it was during
Marshall's day, and for similar reasons. Almost invariably, the
answer given to the question of "founding popular sovereignty"' is
a good predictor of the doctrinal positions that will result. The
question's newfound importance issues-sometimes consciously and
sometimes not-directly from the Court's recent "states' rights"
jurisprudence. Conscious grapplings with the issue reveal at least
three positions along a national/state spectrum. Nationalists, not
surprisingly, argue for the position that a single, national "We the
People of the United States" established the Constitution. "States'
rights" advocates, in contrast, assert that the Constitution sprang
from "We the States." In between, others stake out the position that
it was "We the Peoples" of the respective states who created the new
government. Insofar as this position, too, denies the unity of the
founding populace, state defenders have laid claim to this position
as well. As this part will note, strict logic indicates that none of the
holdings in recent case law turns on which of these positions
prevail, anymore than in McCulloch itself. This part will conclude,
however, that the common sense connection between a given
creation myth and a given set of results has long made strict logic
beside the point.
17. I employ the term "founding popular sovereignty" specifically to apply to the issue of
who established the Constitution as opposed to uses of popular sovereignty that are either
ambiguous or that refer to government accountability to the electorate.
2002] 1343
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Part II considers the 'renewed debate over Marshall's own
positions with regard to both who established the Constitution
and what presumptions should result. As noted, the conventional
wisdom has held that Marshall was the iconic defender of the "We
the People" view, nowhere more so than in McCulloch's account of
popular sovereignty. When, however, Justice Kennedy recycled the
mundane point in Term Limits,18 Justice Thomas countered with an
ostensibly more rigorous reading seeking to locate Marshall at least
in the "We the Peoples" camp.
Part III looks past this dispute to recapture Marshall's own
thinking. Casting the net even more widely confirms not only
Thomas's revisionism, but that the previously indisputable nation-
alist view is simply untenable. Yet this part also demonstrates that
Thomas and his fellow dissenters incorrectly assumed that any
version of a multiple Founding must redound to the benefit of the
states. The basic error lies in placing too much emphasis on state
boundaries and too little on the states' conventions. Though the
revisionists acknowledge that the conventions, as "the people" of the
states, differed from the states, in the sense of the state
governments, they miss the distrust of those state governments
that the use of conventions reflected. Put another way, the Thomas
view wrongly privileges geography over the experience that
Founders such as Marshall had that prompted them to respond to
the vices of the states to begin with.
Looking back, this Article concludes with a final twist suggesting
that Marshall's understanding of the Founding may actually have
been less nationalistic than the Founding itself. Looking ahead, it
also notes that whatever the Founding effected, the Civil War,
Reconstruction, and other subsequent eras of higher lawmaking
cannot continue to be ignored in considering the nation's current
sovereignty foundation. In the meantime, what can be said with
confidence is that Marshall's contribution to the question conceded
the importance of state borders more than previously thought, yet
tamed that concession by demonstrating how and why the
governments of the states ought not be considered the beneficiaries.
18. 514 U.S. 779.
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I. THE STAKES THEN AND Now
A. Federalism Re(?)dux
Figuring out who created the Constitution hardly began with
McCulloch. Among its predecessors, the project goes at least as far
back as Chisholm v. Georgia.9 There, for example, Justice James
Wilson emphasized what historian Gordon Wood has called the
"primal power of the people:"20
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN,
is totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have
been used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not,
perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those, who
ordained and established that Constitution. They might have
announced themselves "SOVEREIGN" people of the United
States: But serenely conscious of that fact, they avoided the
ostentatious declaration.2
Likewise, in Ware v. Hylton,22 Justice Chase addressed much the
same issue in declaring, "There can be no limitation on the power
of the people of the United States. By their authority, the State
Constitutions were made, and by their authority the Constitution
of the United States was established."23 Immediately foreshadowing
McCulloch, Justice Story turned to the question in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,24 stating: "The constitution of the United States
was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign
capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution
declares, by 'the people of the United States.'"2
Perhaps the most thorough early consideration of founding
popular sovereignty came from a previous Chief Justice, John Jay:
19. 2 U.S. (2 DaU.) 419 (1793).
20. WOOD, supra note 10, at 532.
21. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 454.
22. 3 U.S. (3 Dell.) 199 (1796).
23. Id. at 236 (opinion of Chase, J.).
24. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
25. Id. at 324.
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Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from
it [the Articles of Confederation]; and then the people, in their
collective and national capacity, established the present
Constitution. It is remarkable that in establishing it, the people
exercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty,
and conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming
dignity, "We the people of the United States, do ordain and
establish this Constitution." Here we see the people acting as
sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of
sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their
will, that the State Governments should be bound, and to which
the State Constitutions should be made to conform. Every State
Constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of
a State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the
Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by
the people of the United States to govern themselves as to
general objects, in a certain manner.26
Nor was McCulloch the last case to take up the "We the People"
question. In Craig v. Missouri,7 the Court began an extended
analysis, stating, "The government of the United States was one
for the whole of 'the people of the United States."2' Somewhat
later, still another Chief Justice looked at the issue from a less
nationalistic perspective. Writing in Dred Scott, Roger Taney
concluded that, "The brief preamble ... declares that it [the
Constitution] is formed by the people of the United States; that is
to say, by those who were members of the different political
communities in the several States . Apparently asserting an
even more state-oriented position, Chief Justice Waite asserted
"that now the governments of the States possess all the powers of
the Parliament of England, except such as have been delegated to
the United States or reserved by the people." 0
Discussions, analyses, and allusions to founding popular sov-
ereignty have continued in a steady stream to the present. Not
26. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470-71 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
27. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830).
28. Id. at 415.
29. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,410-11 (1857).
30. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876).
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counting recent "states' rights" decisions, 3 a nonexhaustive list
includes: Kansas v. Colorado,3 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,33 Gray v.
Sanders,3 4 Colten v. Kentucky,35 Employees v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare,3" and E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming,37 to name a few.
In nearly all these cases the Court addressed the "We the People"
question en route to resolving a federalism dispute. Anything less
would be surprising. As Chief Justice Waite's opinion suggests, the
states have long been leading candidates as the Constitution's
creators, and that possibility has for just as long been seen as
relevant to how the states function within the framework that the
Constitution sets up. Whether this correlation necessarily follows
is another matter to be considered later. Suffice it to say for now
that the Court has usually thought so, as its repeated forays into
the Constitution's genesis indicate.
It therefore should come as no surprise that recent years have
been boom times for such explorations. While the practical effect of
it all may be an open question, 8 arguably never has the Court
struck down so many acts of Congress in so short a time in the
name of "states' rights." 9 This counterrevolution" began with' the
little noted Gregory v. Ashcroft,' then accelerated through New
York v. United States,41 United States v. Lopez,42 Printz v. United
States,'3 Alden v. Maine," and United States v. Morrison.5 To these,
add the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, which
31. See infra text accompanying notes 38-61.
32. 206 U.S. 46, 90 (1907).
33. 298 U.S. 238,292-97 (1936).
34. 372 U.S. 368, 377 (1963).
35. 407 U.S. 104, 122 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. 411 U.S. 279, 317-24 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. 460 U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity Exception, 110HARV.
L. REv. 102 (1996).
39. This deliberately provocative claim in large part depends on how the relevant terms
are applied. If invalidation based on "states' rights" broadly means any decision that
considers the allocation of power among the federal and state governments, then clearly the
New Deal and even the Progressive Era present rival claims.
40. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
41. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
42. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
43. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
44. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
45. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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has curtailed the opportunities to sue states for the violation of
federal law out of deference to their "sovereignty." Prominent in
this regard are Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,46 Blatchford v.
Native Village ofNoatak,4" and Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents.48
What defeats the "states' rights" cause has suffered, moreover, have
been narrow, such as Term Limits.49 Taken together, these cases
have fueled much academic commentary.5" So complete do the
states' victories appear that many in court and academy herald a
"restoration" of American federalism.
5 1
Whether or not that claim holds water, several features of this
ostensible restoration insure renewed prominence for the "We the
People" question. For starters, these cases ride an ongoing crest of
originalism. Nearly all of the cases feature opinions from justices
who have either pledged allegiance to original understanding as a
central method of constitutional interpretation, such as Justices
Scalia and Thomas,52 pragmatists who deploy it when useful,
including Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,53 or serial dissenters
who chose to fight history with history, especially Justice Souter.54
Taken together, these varying originalist tendencies have time and
again guaranteed lengthy judicial detours into the understandings
of the Founding generation.
Furthering this turn to history is a lack of alternatives upon
which the Court may base its judgments. Text has rarely been an
option. The document itself specifies few safeguards for state
governments,55 far fewer than even the individual rights set out
46. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
47. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
48. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
49. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
50. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311
(1997) (praising same).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-90 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-85 (1991).
53. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,715-45 (1999); New Yorkv. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 163-66 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 760-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
55. Here the most notable, and admittedly entrenched example, is equal suffrage in the
Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Yet beyond this, even provisions that at first glance
seem to safeguard the states in reality do so at the expense of guaranteeing not state
autonomy, but federal intervention. Among provisions in this latter group are the Guarantee
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, and the Militia Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
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prior to the Bill of Rights.5" To paraphrase Justice Scalia on repro-
ductive rights, 7 "the Constitution says absolutely nothing about"
state sovereignty, much less anything about the "commandeering
of state executive officials.""8 Yet exactly these unenumerated
protections have been found sufficiently compelling to trump duly
enacted Federal statutes.
The same goes for structure. Nothing at issue in any of the
Court's neo-"states' rights" jurisprudence logically follows from the
fact that the Constitution contemplates two levels of government.
In Printz, for example, Justice Scalia attempted to demonstrate
that the nation's two-tier governmental framework confirms a
constitutional prohibition against the dragooning of nonjudicial
state officials into implementing federal policy."9 As Justice Breyer
wryly noted, one problem with this conclusion is that the European
Union, a framework with two-tiers of truly sovereign governments,
commandeers national officials in just the manner the majority
said cannot occur in such arrangements and does so as a matter
of course.6" With text that is missing in action and structural
arguments that are circular, history is usually all that is left.6
B. Competing Creation Myths
The Court should and does consider founding popular sovereignty
amidst the resulting history. Nothing in recent opinions, however,
matches Marshall's disquisition on the topic in McCulloch. Rather,
the approach of the current Justices usually crops up as a threshold
trope, based on assumed, well-settled evidence, as a prelude to a
lengthier discussion of the "original understanding" regarding the
more specific issue under dispute, such as state immunity to suits
based on federal law."2 Prelude or not, when the question of who
established the Constitution appears, the discussion falls under one
56. In contrast to "states' rights," Article I, Sections 9 and 10 set out numerous individual
rights, including habeas, no bill of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the obligation of
contracts. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
57. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Id. See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I-VIl.
59. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997).
60. id at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. For a more detailed critique, see Flaherty, supra note 12, at 1286-96.
62. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
2002] 1349
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of three rubrics. Most often, state-oriented justices take a "We the
States" view, suggesting that the original popular sovereigns were
the thirteen sovereign states themselves. At the opposite end of the
spectrum is the "We the People" position, in the sense that the
Constitution's foundation rests on the assent of a single "We the
People of the United States." Somewhere in the middle, though
closer to the "states' rights" end than the nationalist pole, comes the
"We the Peoples" account, a nuanced understanding that posits that
the several discrete populaces of the states, rather than the states
themselves, presided over the creation of the Constitution.
Turn first to the "We the States" view. This most state-orientated
of interpretations merits pride of place as the most popular on
the current Supreme Court. In one typical articulation, Justice
O'Connor teaches that, "the States entered the Federal system with
their sovereignty intact."63 Or again we learn that the states
"adopted the Constitution."64 In this, the Court echoes popular
political rhetoric. Perhaps the most prominent "We the States"
advocate in this regard was the man who appointed several of the
current Justices, Ronald Reagan, who liked to instruct that, "the
States created the Federal Government."65
Once popular as the "compact theory,6 these and other such
statements convey the image of thirteen sovereign governments
coming together to set out a new governmental arrangement
amongst themselves. While alternatives are almost never explored,
these entities appear to be the states' governments rather than
conventions, the populace, or any other rivals that could claim to
embody a given state. This reading seems most natural on a
number of counts. From a "plain meaning" standpoint, the use of
"state" in Supreme Court opinions and in common political parlance
almost always means the state as represented through its
government.
The specific judgments that result today usually wind up
announcing "state" immunities, protections, or other privileges that
redound to those governments. The state governments, in other
words, created a Constitution that reserved special "rights" for state
63. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
65. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 184-85.
1350 [Vol. 43:1339
REVISIONS IN NEED OF REVISING
governments. Madison, however, would chide Jefferson for too
readily, and sloppily, equating the government of a state with a
state in its sovereign capacity when discussing the creation of the
Federal Constitution.6" Modern federalism opinions that assign
original popular sovereignty to the "states" without more are open
to exactly the same reprimand.
By contrast, the "We the People" school could be neither more
clear nor more antithetical. Justice Souter's dissent in Alden v.
Maine sets out the nationalist position by noting James Wilson's
view "that sovereignty was in fact not located in the States at all:
'Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power
resides in the state governments? ... [M]y position is, that
sovereignty resides in the people .... 1"68 A more idiosyncratic "We
the People" advocate is Justice Kennedy, usually a "states' rights"
champion who has on occasion rejected at least certain especially
extreme state claims. In Term Limits, Kennedy seized just such an
occasion to place himself in what he saw as quintessentially the
tradition of John Marshall. "It might be objected," he wrote, "that
because the States ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate
power only through the States or by acting in their capacities as
citizens of particular States."69 After approvingly citingMcCulloch,
Kennedy endorsed the idea of "[tihe political identity of the entire
people of the Union."70
In these and other statements, the "We the People" view posits
a founding popular sovereign that is truly national. Stated more
fully, the interpretation holds that the Constitution owes its
foundation to a single people that gave their assent to the document
outside normal government institutions-national (under the
67. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 29, 1798), in 17 PAPERS Or
JAMES MADISON 191-92 (David B. Mattera et al. eds., 1991) (asking "[hiave you ever
considered thoroughly the distinction between the power of the State, & that of the
Legislature, on questions relating to the federal pact").
68. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 777 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting James
Wilson) (citations omitted). Souter also denies that Wilson was a radical nationalist and
asserts instead that he was within the mainstream. Id. at 777 n.16 ("Butwhile Wilson's view
of sovereignty was indeed radical in its deviation from older conceptions, this hardly
distanced him from the American mainstream .... ").
69. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 840 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
70. Id& at 841.
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Articles of Confederation) or state-transforming them in the
process. No less crucially, this idea invariably presages doctrinal
conclusions that reject state privileges and validate federal
authority.
71
Challenging these two poles, finally, domes the "We the Peoples"
position. Set out by Justice Thomas, at one point this idea
technically commanded the assent of three other Justices, though
it is unclear to what extent they remain truly committed to it-as
opposed to the "We the States" interpretation-rather than having
simply signed onto a lengthy and complex dissent without opting
out of every point with which they disagreed.7 2 As Thomas
expresses it, "the notion of popular sovereignty that undergirds the
Constitution does not erase state boundaries, but rather tracks
them. The people of each State obviously did trust their fate to the
people of the several States when they consented to the
Constitution," he elaborates, "[alt the same time, however, the
people of each State retained their separate political identities.7 3
In this way the "We the Peoples" position parts company with
essential aspects of its competitors. Unlike the "We the States"
view, it refuses to equate measures of a state government with the
expression of a state in its sovereign capacity. Yet unlike the classic
"We the People" view, it also refuses to assume that expressions of
popular sovereignty by default had to be national. Instead, a people
could be defined by a state's borders but still express their
sovereign will outside the channels of state government. Exactly
this occurred, moreover, nine, then thirteen, times at the present
republic's Founding.
71. Cf Alden, 527 U.S. at 778 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the sovereignty of the
people as it applies to sovereign immunity).
72. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Joining him were Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, consistent"states' rights" votes all. Id.
73. Id. at 849. On textual, historical, and structural grounds, Henry Monaghan stakes
out one further position that falls between a simple "We the People" and "We the Peoples"
view. Thus, for him, "[alt its creation, the American Constitution rested upon two pillars:
namely, 'We the People' (nationally understood) and the several states (i.e., 'We the People'
thereof) as independent political communities. The result was a constitutional order that, as
Madison stated, was 'neither wholly national nor whollyfederal." Monaghan, supra note 13,
at 129 (citations omitted). Monaghan captures this position nicely in entitling his article, We
the People[s]. Id.
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For Justice Thomas in particular, the "We the Peoples" account
has attractions beyond its ostensible historical accuracy. As he
applies it to the doctrinal issues in Term Limits, the threshold
existence of thirteen sovereign peoples supports the conclusion that
the people of any state-at least as manifested through a state
constitutional amendment-can place constraints on the tenure of
their federal representatives.74 Beyond this, the Thomas dissent
suggests that the people of the state can achieve the same ends
through ordinary legislation; an extension that effectively benefits
state governments as if the underlying basis of the Constitutionhad
been "We the States" after all."h The use of an apparently moderate
historical interpretation in the service of a "states' rights" result
cannot fail to have a certain tactical appeal. Thomas's intermediate
interpretation has the further virtue of support from a proper
reading of John Marshall, in reality, a long misunderstood 've the
Peoples" advocate. In this light, the Thomas version of the theory
offers two challenges to the conventional wisdom for the price of
one.
C. The Irrelevance of Logical Irrelevance
Does choosing among these creation stories matter?
Dispassionate legal analysis suggests not. Professor Larry Kramer
has rightly pointed out that determining the nature of the popular
sovereign that created this new constitutional order is not the
same thing as determining the nature of the order itself.7 "We the
People of the United States" could easily have decided, among other
things: that the power of the new Federal government should
be minute; state sovereign immunity, broad; and an authority to
"commandeer" state executive officials, nonexistent. "We the
States," conversely, could just as easily have ordained a consol-
idated national government that came out differently on any or all
of these issues. It follows that nothing predetermines that the
intermediate possibility of "We the Peoples of the United States"
74. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 916-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see infra text accompanying notes 285-
87.
76. Professor Larry Kramer of New York University School of Law has raised this point
several times in private conversations.
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would have had to have adopted a set of intermediate positions if
those several peoples thought it best to create a framework on one
end of the spectrum or the other. Historian G. Edward White hints
at this in aptly stating that Marshall began McCulloch "by asking,
rhetorically, whether the Constitution was a creation of the
sovereign states or of the people."77
Put another way, the freedom which a popular sovereign by
definition enjoys means that it is at liberty to transcend its own
likely inclinations or tendencies. As a result, the "We the People"
question is logically distinct from almost any of the federalism
issues that it prefaces. Marshall appears to have recognized this
dichotomy when saying that it was "counsel for the state of
Maryland" who had thought it of "some importance" to identify the
founding sovereign "in the construction of the constitution."7'
Yet just because an alternative is possible does not mean that it
is likely. Common sense and intuition indicate that although a
sovereign may not be compelled to create a regime in its own image,
chances are it will. It would be odd for a nationally oriented
lawgiver not to create a nationally oriented government, or a state-
oriented counterpart not to guard state authority, or an inter-
mediate sovereign not to settle for some set of compromises. These
presumptions might well be rebutted in specific instances. A
decision by the sovereign states, through their several governments,
allowing for a national military79 -even Federal control of their
own militias8°-would make sense in light of a demonstrated
national weakness or internal inability to put down insurrections."'
Such departures, however, would do nothing to refute an overall
supposition that the states readily gave away authority to a rival
center of power without a compelling reason. The popular sover-
eignty question can never replace further analysis of a particular
issue, yet it remains a vital foundational inquiry nonetheless.
77. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERIcAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 27 (1988).
78. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,402 (1819).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14; art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; art. II, §2, cl. 1.
81. For accounts concerning internal instability, see RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 33-34;
WOOD, supra note 10, at 393-413. For a treatment dealing with national weakness, see
generally FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1973).
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So, more importantly, has nearly everyone thought. Throughout
our history, leading constitutional figures have in fact assumed that
whatever created the republic goes a long way toward determining
what kind of republic was created. As noted, this leitmotif is at
least as old as judicial review itself. However "irrelevant" to the
specific issue at hand, the "We the People" problem has attracted a
judicial roster that includes Jay, Wilson, Story, Taney, Waite,
Douglas, Brennan, and of course John Marshall himself.8 2 This list,
moreover, does not include those statesmen engaging in constitu-
tional interpretation from the other branches, a perspective recently
rediscovered and reasserted."' Nor, as also noted, do the "People,"
"States," or "Peoples," show any sign of quitting the stage. To the
contrary, the recent spate of divided "states' rights" decisions has
given consideration of founding sovereignty a renewed vitality that
is likely to persist as long as the justices and their academic allies
divide on the underlying doctrine.85 Whatever its logical connection
to particular results, the Constitution's creation myth remains "of
some importance" if for no other reason than our constitutional
culture continues to deem it so.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 18-54.
83. David P. Currie's project of recapturing constitutional argumentation in Congress
and the Presidency has been especially valuable in this regard. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTIONIN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001). For an assessment
of the project's value in this regard, see Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1089,1090-91 (2001); see also JOSEPHM. LYNCH, NEGOTIATINGTHE CONSTITUTION: THE
EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999) (examining constitutional debate outside
the judiciary).
84. For work debating judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation, see MARK V.
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COuRTS (2000); Christopher L.
Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347
(1994); Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 123 (1999); Kramer, supra note 2; Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in
Theory and Practice. Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for his Critics, 83
GEO. L.J. 373 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); MarkV. Tushnet, Two Versions of Judicial
Supremacy, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 945 (1998); Symposium, The Federalist Society Sixth
Annual Symposium on Law and Public Policy: The Crisis in Legal Theory and the Revival
of Classical Jurisprudence, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 281, 371-400 (1988) (essays by John
Harrison, Burt Neuborne, Robert Nagel, and Steven Ross).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 38-61.
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II. MARSHALL, THE POPULAR SOVEREIGN(S), AND THEIR LEGACY
A. Conventional Wisdom
So close is the renewed scrutiny that Marshall himself has been
transformed from a source of authority to a subject of controversy.
Recently, usual understandings of Marshall's position on founding
sovereignty have been contested in much the same way as the issue
itself.
For the most part, the conventional scholarly wisdom places
Marshall and McCulloch firmly in the "We the People" camp.
Somewhat surprisingly, this standard view rests less on extended
analysis than on quotations from McCulloch. To this extent, some
traditional assessments offer only slightly more express guidance
than Marshall himself as to whether "the people" really did mean
a single American people. All treatments, however, make clear that
Marshall had no truck with the idea that "the states," in the sense
of state governments, acted as the founding sovereigns. This
acknowledgment usually combines with a nationalist tone and an
apparent binary conception of the available choice to leave a single
national populace the remaining alternative.
These features characterize the older views in particular.
Marshall's first great biographer, Albert Beveridge, takes up
McCulloch, declaring that Marshall's treatment of founding
sovereignty "gives an historical account of the Constitution which,
for clearness and brevity, never has been surpassed."86 Noting
that Marshall rejected compact theory, Beveridge emphasizes
McCulloch's assertion that "[t]he Government of the American
Nation is, then, 'emphatically and truly, a government of the
people. In form and in substance it emanates from them.'"" For
good measure, Beveridge adds that "the grandeur" of Marshall's
assertion "was to be enhanced forty-four years later, when, standing
on the battlefield of Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln said that 'a
86. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, 4 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 292 (1919). Beveridge then
quotes the three paragraphs from McCulloch that constitute this account in full. Id. at 292
n.2.
87. Id. at 293 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,405 (1819)).
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government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not
perish from the earth.'"""
Edward S. Corwin gave the same answer less floridly and a bit
more clearly:
At the very outset of his argument in the Bank case Marshall
singled out the question the answer to which must control all
interpretation of the Constitution: Was the Constitution, as
contended by counsel for Maryland, "an act of sovereign and
independent States" whose political interests must be jealously
safeguarded in its construction, or was it an emanation from the
American people and designed for their benefit? Marshall
answered that the Constitution, by its own declaration, was
"ordained and established" in the name of the people.89
Over time the conventional view had become even more clearly
nationalistic. According to Leonard Baker, McCulloch's "first
problem was whether the Constitution stemmed from the people of
America or from the states."' If "the Constitution emanated from
the people, then what was done in the name of the Constitution
could not be challenged by the state powers."91 Having set these
binary stakes, Baker answers that, "[in dealing with this question,
Marshall was not even kind to the advocates of states' rights."9" To
the contrary, he notes, "[tihat the conventions were held in the
separate states was explained by Marshall as a fact of geographical
necessity rather than as a significant political influence."" The
respected historian R. Kent Newmyer echoed this point, stating
that Marshall asserted that ratification took place at the state level,
"not because the states were sovereign, but because that was the
only practical and convenient way to proceed, since the American
88. Id. at 293 (quoting Lincoln). Beveridge adds, but does not elaborate, that "the
Nationalist ideas of Marshall and Lincoln are identical." Id. at 293 n.3.
89. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHNMARSHALLANDTHE CONSTIMION 130-31(1919) (emphasis
added).
90. LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 594 (1974).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 594-95.
93. Id. at 595 (emphasis added). Echoing Baker, Henry Monaghan argues that "[flor
Marshall, the fact that the Constitution was ratified by the people voting in their separate
states at conventions was a natural administrative convenience." Monaghan, supra note 13,
at 135 n.85.
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people could not ratify en masse."94 Perhaps most concise is Charles
Hobson, one of Marshall's most recent biographers and current
director of Marshall's Papers at The College of William and Mary.
As Hobson puts it, "Marshall premised constitutional nationalism
on a theory of the Constitution as a constituent act of the people of
the United States, not a compact among the several states."95
Amidst this accord, G. Edward White offers at least one
distinctive voice. At first blush, White might seem to explain
McCulloch in conventional terms. In his important The Marshall
Court and Cultural Change, he characterizes the opinion as
asserting that, "[in the process of ratification sovereignty had not
been transferred from the states to the Union, but to the people,
and then to the Union."96 More importantly, White relies heavily on
what Gerald Gunther has termed Marshall's "out-of-court"97
commentary, to emphasize Marshall's "denial of the legitimacy of
compact theory."98
But to say that White believes Marshall championed the "We the
People" position would be a mistake. To the contrary, White's work
is careful to note that for Marshall the choice between popular
sovereigns came down to the state governments versus "the people
who made up those states,"99 "the people ... as representatives of
states,"' 0 and "the people of the states." 1' White, in other words,
94. R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, McCullochv. Maryland, and the Southern States'
Rights Tradition, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 897 (2000).
95. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 111 (1996). Hobson's assertion comes in the course ofdiscussingthree cases: McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821),
and Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). HOBSON, supra; see also
id. at 116-26 (discussing McCulloch and the reactions it provoked).
Francis Stites agrees with this assertion when he says that for Marshall, "[T]he
Constitution was not a compact between sovereign states but an instrument of government
created by the people 'in their highest capacity' as sovereign individuals." FRANCIS N. STITES,
JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1981). Stites might be read as
developing some distinction between a sovereign American people and sovereign individuals
in general, but the context and brevity of his analysis make it clear that his agenda on this
point is to reiterate the traditional view.
96. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURTAND CULTURAL CHANGE 545 (1988).
97. Gerald Gunther, Unearthing John Marshall's Major Out-of-Court Constitutional
Commentary, 21 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1969).
98. WHITE, supra note 96, at 563.
99. WHITE, supra note 77, at 27.
100. WHITE, supra note 96, at 563.
101. Id.
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views Marshall as rejecting "We the States" in favor of "We the
Peoples."'12 What he does not do, however, is fully reconcile
Marshall's concept of multiple sovereigns with his seemingly
complete rejection of compact theory. If Marshall's denial that the
Constitution is a compact means that the several states could not
have signed on, left unclear is why this same denial does not have
a similar effect on the peoples of the several states. Working the
other way, if the peoples of the states could no more have agreed to
create a Constitution than the states themselves, left in doubt is the
basis for viewing the peoples as the true popular sovereigns.
For present purposes, what matters are less-specific aspects of
White's analysis than the ongoing dominance of the conventional
wisdom. In fairness, White's references to founding popular sover-
eignty, although more thorough, do not pretend to offer a full-
fledged revisionist challenge to the received wisdom on Marshall
and founding sovereignty. 10 3 In the absence of such attempts,
Marshall's place as the champion of"We the People" seemed secure.
B. Kennedy v. Thomas
The real challenge to the conventional wisdom came not from
scholars, but from the Court itself. Term Limits, which considered
the foundational question of whether the states could mandate
rotation in office for their Congressional representatives, provided
the setting."" The various opinions in the case may not have
produced the most searching discussion of federal/state sovereignty
since McCulloch. They do, however, offer the best window on the
Justices' differing conceptions regarding the issue since the recent
102. White's McCulloch analysis more or less rejects the "We the People" thesis sub
silentio. At one point, his silence actually amounts to omission when he oddly and
uncharacteristically quotes Marshall's "out-of-court" conclusion that "[o]ur Constitution is
not a compact. It is the act of the people of the United States assembling in their respective
states, and adopting a government for the whole nation," id. at 564 (quoting John Marshall,
AFriend ofthe Constitution, in JOHNMASHALL'sDEFENSEOFMCCULLOCHV. MARYLAND 203
(Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter DEFENSE]), but omits the sentence that came in
between, declaring "[ilt is the act of a single party." Id.
103. White's massive study is more concerned with, among other things, linking the
Marshall Court's jurisprudence with conceptions of republicanism and with examining
changing conceptions of the judiciary's role in the Federal system. WHITE, supra note 96,
passim.
104. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783-87 (1995).
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line of "states' rights" cases began, including their conceptions of
McCulloch.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion provided the conventional
foil. In part to defend his defection from his usual "states' rights"
allies, Kennedy wrote separately in large part to defend the "We the
People" thesis.'1 5 "In my view," the concurrence begins, "it is well
settled that the whole people of the United States asserted their
political identity and unity of purpose when they created the federal
system."'0 6 Not content with this, Kennedy also takes on the "We
the Peoples" case (the "We the States" view apparently not even
rising to the level of meriting refutation). Conceding that the people
of his state retained separate political identities, the opinion asserts
that "[ilt does not at all follow from this that the sole political
identity of an American is with the State of his or her residence."'
Instead, "the people of the United States ... have a political identity
as well, one independent of, though consistent with, their identity
as citizens of [a] State."10 8
Making this argument inevitably leads to Marshall and
McCulloch. No sooner does the concurrence quote Madison, than
it turns to McCulloch's declaration that the government "'is
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people." 9 For
Kennedy, it is axiomatic that by "the people" Marshall meant the
national populace rather than the peoples of the several states. "It
might be objected," he acknowledges, "that because the States
ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power only
through the States or by acting in their capacities as citizens of
particular States. But in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court set
forth its authoritative rejection of this idea.""0 For good measure,
Kennedy ends his treatment of McCulloch quoting at length
105. Kennedy apparently reconciles his commitment to the "We the People" thesis with
his usual position in favor of most "states' rights" claims by emphasizing that what the
national populace created was a national government that is supreme within a nonetheless
limited sphere that the judiciary must be vigilant in policing. See id. at 841 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
106. Id. at 838.
107. Id. at 840.
108. Id.
109. Id. 839 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,316
(1819)).
110. Id. at 840 (citation omitted).
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Marshall's famous passage about the meaning of ratification taking
place in the states, which he clearly takes to be nationalist."'
What seemed-and at least concerning Marshall has been'-so
mundane and well-settled for Justice Kennedy proved to be
anything but for Justice Thomas and the three "states' rights"
Justices who joined his dissent."1 It appears in fact that Thomas's
challenge of the "We the People" credo prompted Kennedy to take
up its defense. The standard invocation of Marshall that the
defense made, in turn, gave the dissent its opportunity to debunk
that ostensible shibboleth as well." 4
Thomas makes clear from the outset that "first principles" of
founding sovereignty should preface consideration of doctrine, and
that the only proper understanding on this point is that 'Ve the
Peoples" created the Constitution." 5 As the dissent puts it:
Our system of government rests on one overriding principle: All
power stems from the consent of the people. To phrase the
principle in this way, however, is to be imprecise about
something important to the notion of "reserved powers." The
ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of
the people of each individual State, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." 6
Thomas bases his reading on structure and text. He notes first
that the Article VII ratification process mandated that the
Constitution would take effect only after nine conventions
assembling within existing state borders approved the proposal,
and then it would be in "effect only 'between the States so ratifying
the same."'117 Thomas expressly concludes that this formula
demonstrates the Constitution could not have been the work of a
111. Id. at 840-41.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 76-89.
113. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. Kennedy makes clear that he writes in direct response to the dissents views on
founding popular sovereignty. Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Apart from an initial
passing reference to McCulloch in the main body of his opinion, Thomas indicates that his
reinterpretation of McCulloch comes in response to Kennedy. Id. at 849-50 & n.2 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 846, 883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 846.
117. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VII).
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single national populace and implicitly views the reliance on
conventions rather than the state governments as proof that neither
could the Constitution have been ordained by "We the States.""'8 As
for text, Thomas asserts that the Preamble's ostensibly nationalist
use of "We the People of the United States'""' 9 actually amounted
to no more than a technical and stylistic change to the original
draft formulation that declared, "We the people of the States of
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations'" and the rest. 20
Thomas further bases his thesis on Marshall and McCulloch.
Here he seizes on Marshall's observation that "'[n]o political
dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines
which separate the States, and of compounding the American
people into one common mass.'"' 2 ' Kennedy, following the usual
view, can only conclude that Marshall referred to the practical
or geographical impossibility of bringing the American people
together, even if only in the form of delegates to one grand ratifying
convention. For Thomas, however, Marshall's observation is consti-
tutional first and last.
As with many revisionist assertions, 2 Thomas stakes his claim
on greater rigor. In his view, the clue that unlocks the meaning of
Marshall's assertion can be found by reading the materials on the
case that U.S. Reports includes beyond the Court's opinion.2 In
particular, this means the summary of argument made by counsel
for the state of Maryland that prompted Marshall's foray into
founding sovereignty in the first place. 24 As the dissent rightly
observes, Maryland's counsel 2 presented a stark choice between
118. The closest Thomas comes to making this latter point explicit is his approving
reference to Marshall's rejection of state compact theory. See id. at 849 n.2.
119. Id. at 846 n.1 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
120. Id. (quoting2RECORDSOFTHEFEDERALCONVENTIONOF 1787, at 565 (M. Farranded.,
1911)).
121. Id. at 849 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819)).
122. Whether Thomas himself views his interpretation of McCulloch as revisionist is
another matter. He notes no opinion or scholarly work interpreting the case, apparently
content instead to let the evidence on which he relies speak for itself.
123. Id. at 853-55 (discussing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316-400).
124. Id. (discussing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 362-77).
125. Although the dissent does not identify him, Thomas refers to the argument made by
Walter Jones. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 362-63. Underscoring McCulloch's contemporary
importance, each side had the benefit of some of the best constitutional advocates of the day.
1362 [Vol. 43:1339
REVISIONS IN NEED OF REVISING
the national populace school of "We the People" and the compact
theory of"We the States." 6 But Marshall navigated between these
extremes. As Thomas also rightly contends, Marshall rejected
"counsel's conclusion that the Constitution was ... merely 'a
compact between the States."'27 Nonetheless-and here marks
Thomas's revisionism-Marshall also rejected the simple nation-
alist view. The evidence is Marshall's acceptance, even to the point
of paraphrasing, of Maryland's own repudiation of the nationalist
view in arguing that:
[T]he constitution was formed and adopted, not by the people of
the United States at large, but by the people of the respective
States. To suppose that the mere proposition of this
fundamental law threw [sic] the American people into one
aggregate mass, would be to assume what the instrument itself
does not profess to establish.' 28
Marshall, in other words, split the difference, much like the
Constitution itself. He adopted Maryland's repudiation of the
nationalist view. Yet in doing so he made clear that neither did he
accept the compact-theory baggage that the state attached to its
repudiation. In this way, Thomas concludes, McCulloch's celebrated
passages should properly be moved into the "We the Peoples"
camp.1
29
For Thomas, state-oriented doctrine immediately follows. The
most compelling application arises out of Term Limits itself. There
"the people" of Arkansas, by amending their own Constitution,
sought "to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who
Besides Jones, Maryland retained Joseph Hopkinson and Luther Martin, a leading and
increasingly state-oriented member of the Founding generation, who was arguing his last
important case before the Court. WHITE, supra note 96, at 543. Arguing for the United States
were Attorney General William Wirt, Daniel Webster, and, delivering the most widely
regarded performance of all, William Pinckney. Id. at 246. As another measure of
McCulloch's importance, the Court waived its usual two-day limit on oral argument. STITES,
supra note 95, at 130.
126. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 853-55 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (discussing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 362-77).
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seek to represent them in Congress." 3 Under the "We the Peoples"
thesis, the dissent argues, this ought to have been an easy case.'
3
'
On that theory, "[tihe Constitution derives its authority.., from the
consent of the people of the States," as manifested in the state
ratifying conventions.3 2 As a result, any authority not granted to
the federal government by the Constitution is ultimately reserved
to these founding sovereigns, a conclusion later made explicit in the
Tenth Amendment. Stated this way, the sole question in Term
Limits becomes whether the federal Constitution precludes actions
for which the peoples of the states never gave authority.
33
Employing various standard methods of interpretation-express
text, necessary implication, original understanding, structural
analysis-the dissent sees no such impediment for the people of
Arkansas with regard to placing term limits on their federal
representatives. Yet the strength (or lack thereof) of this conclusion
is not what made Term Limits an especially good case to apply "We
the Peoples" analysis in this way. What did make this a good case
was that, in this instance, the eligibility requirements were not
imposed by the state legislature but by "the people themselves." 34
If they did not do this through a convention, as during the
Founding, they at least did so through the rough modern equivalent
of a state constitutional ballot initiative-an exercise that would
appear to have rendered the act more solemn and fundamental
than a simple statute. 35
But the "We the Peoples" view does not merely support acts of the
people of each individual state. In the dissent's hands, it no less
benefits state governments. As Thomas makes clear from the
outset, the reserved power of a particular state's people need not be
asserted through a constitutional amendment in a specific
instance.3 6 Such an assertion can just as easily be made through
"the elected legislature of that State,"' so long as the people have
130. Id. at 845.
131. Id. at 845-46.
132. Id. at 851.
133. Id. at 847.
134. Id. at 845.
135. Id. at 779, 783-84.
136. Id. at 845-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 845.
1364 [Vol. 43:1339
20021 REVISIONS IN NEED OF REVISING 1365
"authorize[d] their elected state legislators to do so."' So long as
a state constitution confers authority on the legislature to act, any
statute within that delegation ultimately rests on the consent, not
just of the state's most recent electorate, but of its founding people.
The dissent, moreover, places no limits on whether such a state
constitutional delegation need be express or general, even with
regard to actions bearing upon federal matters." 9 Nor is it easy to
see how it could, given that the terms of such a delegation would
be purely matters of state law. What is clear is that the state
restricts the invalidation of federally imposed term limits whether
by amendment or statute."4 So extended, the "We the Peoples"
thesis leads to a result as beneficial to a state's government as to
extraordinary manifestations of its populace. In such fashion, resort
to a "We the States" account becomes redundant. 41
How else a "We the Peoples" founding benefits state government
is less clear. In the course of his analysis, Thomas does distinguish
Term Limits from the Court's other recent federalism cases. That
case, he points out, deals with "whether Article I bars state action
that it does not appear to forbid."'42 By contrast, cases such as
Garcia," National League of Cities,1' and New York v. United
138. Id. at 846.
139. Id. at 851-52.
140. Id. at 917 & n.39.
141. In the context of Term Limits, the "We the Peoples" hypothesis actually supports the
state governments more than the "We the States" view. Specifically, Thomas rejects the
majority's attempt to limit the "reserved" powers that states can exercise to those that they
did not possess at the time of the Founding, including the authority to place requirements
on who could sit in Congress. As Thomas puts it, while this conclusion would follow if the
state governments had created the Constitution, it could not if the peoples of the states did
so:
The majority's essential logic is that the state governments could not"reserve"
any powers that they did not control at the time the Constitution was drafted.
But it was not the state governments that were doing the reserving. The
Constitution derives its authority instead from the consent of the people of the
States. Given the fundamental principle that all governmental powers stem
from the people of the States, it would simply be incoherent to assert that the
people of the States could not reserve any powers that they had not previously
controlled.
Id. at 851. Whether the majority adopted the "We the States" account, as Thomas asserts,
is another matter. Id. at 800-05.
142. Id at 853.
143. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 569 U.S. 528 (1985).
144. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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States145 ask "whether any principle of state sovereignty implicit in
the Tenth Amendment bars congressional action that Article I
appears to authorize. " 146 Thus, in Term Limits, the state action
should win because its people enjoy a sovereign founding power that
they never gave up, as reflected in the Constitution's own silence.
In the other cases, the states should, or at least could, win because
"principles of state sovereignty" that the Constitution affirmatively
recognizes bar federal actions that would otherwise be legitimate,
such as the regulation of state employees. Unlike reserved powers,
these "sovereignty principles" do not necessarily follow from the
mere fact that the peoples of the states created the Constitution,
because approving them would presumably have required an
affirmative decision rather than simply declining to delegate
additional power. On the dissent's analysis, in other words, a "We
the Peoples" account of the Founding does not necessarily mean
that "the peoples," without more, decided to recognize state
sovereign immunity, or an anticommandeering principle, or a bar
against federal regulation of state functions.
Or does it? In the short term, the dissent aimed to distinguish the
two types of cases to parry the majority's use of certain language
from Garcia. Suggestive, however, is Thomas's apparently ap-
proving reference to invoking "traditional aspects of state
sovereignty'" to invalidate federal statutes on the heels of his "We
the States" account. 47 More important, however, is the dynamic
that use of creation myths propels. With the exception of Justice
Kennedy, it seems no accident that all of the Justices who accept
"state sovereignty" principles signed on to Thomas's version of both
the Founding and Marshall. As they have made clear-elsewhere, for
them it can be a short leap from conflating a state-oriented refusal
to give up authority with a no less state-oriented grant of state
sovereignty protections.14 Given that founding popular sovereignty
145. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
146. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 853 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 852 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841).
148. Exactly this process occurred in the line running fromNew York u. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992), through Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and culminating in
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). In New York, the majority ultimately concluded that
its pro-state "anticommandeering" principle resulted from the Constitution's failure to grant
the federal government that power. New York, 505 U.S. at 187-88. Printz appeared to follow
this logic, or at least did not assert otherwise. See Flaherty, supra note 12 at 1283-85. In
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"does not erase state boundaries, but rather tracks them,"'49 the
same considerations that prompted the peoples not to part with
their powers to create terms limits likewise led them to approve
sovereignty constraints to protect the state governments from
federal encroachment.
III. MARSHALL REDUX
A. Revisionism Without More
It would at first appear difficult to sustain either of Justice
Thomas's propositions, whether on Marshall's conception of the
Founding or the doctrinal implications that result. Further review,
however, suggests that the dissent in Term Limits fares at least as
well as counsel for the state of Maryland in McCulloch, and that
Maryland did not do all that badly. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, Thomas rightly reads Marshall as adopting Maryland's
repudiation of the "We the People" account, the more safely to put
forth a"We the Peoples" understanding. In this world turned upside
down, Thomas's revisionism suffers only because of its lack of
confidence. Conversely, the dissent would have done well to balk
before it converted its more state-oriented account into state-
determinative outcomes. As McCulloch's outcome hints, tracking
state boundaries furnishes only one set of presumptions about
founding sovereignty. Set against these are the presumptions that
arise from placing sovereignty outside normal state government
processes-the other key feature of the "We the Peoples" account.
For Marshall, if not for the Founding generation, this set of
considerations not only applied in the first instance, but applied
more strongly.
But perhaps things need not get even this far. Whatever evidence
Thomas brings to bear on the Founding, his reinterpretation is
hardly compelling on its own terms. For one thing, McCulloch's
Reno, however, the Court in passing indicated that the anticommandeering bar had been a
sovereignty principle all along. Reno v. Charlie Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) ("In New
York and Printz, we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative
authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of
federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.").
149. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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language at no point expressly adopts anything approaching a "We
the Peoples" thesis. Although Marshall repeatedly employs the
terms "the people" and "they," at no point does he clarify what he
means in terms of "peoples" or-more likely given the usage of the
day--"people" of the respective, several, individual, or separate
states, or even just states without more. For another example,
Thomas builds his entire case on Marshall's apparent borrowing of
a single phrase. The resulting burden the words must shoulder
becomes even heavier given that Thomas ignores Marshall's
extensive cribbing from the arguments made on behalf of the
United States.' 50
Marshall's asymmetrical debt on this score leads to an even more
telling problem. Despite his commitment to greater context,
Thomas fails to acknowledge the structure of the argument in
which Marshall's borrowing appears. Recall that Marshall intro-
duces his discussion of founding popular sovereignty in response to
"counsel for the state of Maryland['s]" assertion of compact theory,
along with the corollaries that the powers of the federal government
were delegated by the states, that the states alone are sovereign,
and that the federal government must exercise its delegated powers
in subordination to the states.'' Marshall makes clear that he
raises Maryland's specific points, which he collapses into one
"proposition," to show how "difficult to sustain" they are.'52 As he
rejects one after the other, nowhere does he indicate that the state
has put forward anything worth salvaging.' 3
Then again, Thomas's revisionist take does have several things
going for it, not all of which the dissent itself brings out. First,
nowhere in McCulloch does Marshall expressly equate "the people"
with a single, national populace. This failure alone makes the
opinion seem a curious choice as a talisman for the "We the People"
view. Second, and following from this failure, the dissent does
properly look to sources beyond the opinion itself to resolve the
ambiguity.'5 ' Third, the resemblance between Jones's "threw the
150. See infra text accompanying notes 155-60.
151. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 402-04.
154. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 553-54.
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American people into one aggregate mass"'55 and Marshall's
"compounding the American people into one common mass""'
does suggest that the opinion at least bowed to counsel's rhetoric
and so, at least presumptively, his substance as well. Bolstering
this surmise, though again the dissent does not mention it, was
Marshall's habit of drawing extensively from lawyers' arguments,
often nearly verbatim.'57 McCulloch was no exception, as far more
extensive borrowing from the arguments for the United States
indicate.15 Nor was Marshall in a position to do anything else but
borrow given that he issued the Court's opinion a mere four days
after the conclusion of six days of oral argument. 159
Yet without more one way or the other, the revisionist challenge
would appear to be just that. The "rediscovery" of Marshall's reli-
ance on Jones suggests that the conventional wisdom may have also
viewed McCulloch's rejection of Maryland's position too completely.
On its own, however, the suggestion hardly seems sufficient to
overturn the standard account itself. For that matter, defenders of
the conventional wisdom would not be without rejoinders. Far from
agreeing with the state, for example, Marshall could simply have
been turning its argument on its head as would any cagey lawyer.
Why think, without further evidence, that McCulloch's echoing of
Jones indicates that Marshall subtly adopted Maryland's rejection
of the "We the States" view while accepting a "We the Peoples"
understanding that the state itself never put forward? Far more
straightforward is a reading in which Marshall employs Jones's
repudiation of the nationalist understanding to trivialize it. No
one thought that "We the People" could assemble to ordain the
Constitution, not because, as Jones argued, the alternative was a
state-bound compact theory, but rather, as one of Marshall's
biographers later stated, because of "geographical necessity." 160
But there is more evidence-substantial, well-known, and readily
available in accurate form for the past several decades. 6' As the
155. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316 (argument of Walter Jones).
156. Id. at 403.
157. See WHITE, supra note 96, at 247-50.
158. Id.
159. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 321, 400.
160. BAKER, supra note 90, at 595.
161. See, e.g., Gunther, Introduction to DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 1.
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man who reintroduced this evidence has written, McCulloch
produced a substantial out-of-court debate, "with the Chief Justice
of the United States in the unique role of waging newspaper battle
with the chief ideological opponents of the Supreme Court."'62 This
battle had two chapters. The Court handed down McCulloch on
March 6, 1819.163 Before the month was out, Virginia's Richmond
Enquirer published a series of attacks on the case by"Amphictyon,"
probably Judge William Brockenbrough. 16' To these Marshall
anonymously replied as "A Friend to the Union" in the Philadelphia
Union during the next month. Less than a month later, the
Richmond Enquirer published an even more extensive set of four
essays, these written by "Hampden," in reality the formidable
Judge Spencer Roane of the Virginia Court of Appeals. 165 Marshall
responded with a nine-part reply under the pseudonym, "A Friend
of the Constitution" in the Alexandria Gazette. '66
Until Gerald Gunther reconstructed this exchange, Marshall's
first contribution had been known only in garbled form and his
second set of essays had been lost for nearly 150 years. 167 This long
gap may have had something to do with the usual treatment of
Marshall on founding sovereignty. Reliance on outside materials to
resolve ambiguities in U.S. Reports simply was not an option for
most of our history, especially when it took the Thomas dissent to
put those ambiguities back in play.
B. Marshall's Creation Myth
What matters, however, is what the exchange shows. Whether
as "A Friend to the Union" or "A Friend of the Constitution,"
Marshall's basic response to his two adversaries proceeds in
two stages. Initially, Marshall concentrates on reaffirming
McCulloch's denial that the Constitution was established by the
162. Id.
163. BAKER, supra note 90, at 593.
164. Gunther, Introduction to DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 1.
165. Roane's "Hamrpden" Essays, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 106.
166. For the definitive scholarly account of how these essays originated, how Marshall's
contributions were garbled or lost, and how the exchange was reconstructed, see Gunther,
Unearthing John Marshall's Major Out-of-Court Constitutional Commentary, supra note 97,
at 449-55.
167. Gunther, Introduction to DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 2, 14-15.
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state government. After this, he turns to defending the Court
against the accusation that it claimed the Constitution was
conversely the creation of the American people as one
undifferentiated mass. Along the way, Marshall makes clear that
the position McCulloch actually staked out fell in between-that
the Constitution was created by the peoples of the several states
composing distinct political societies assembling in their highest
sovereign capacity.
Consider the initial stage. Marshall's first sustained discussion
of the issue leaves no doubt that any argument that the state
governments established the new national order is untenable. At
the same time, it also makes plain that the McCulloch opinion
specifically, if not entirely clearly, asserted that the Constitution
was instead established by the peoples of the respective states. The
analysis in "A Friend to the Union" merits quotation at some
length:
I will proceed to consider the first objection made to the
opinion of the Supreme Court. It is stated to be "the denial that
the powers of the federal government were delegated by the
states."
This assertion is not literally true.-The court has not, in
terms, denied "that the powers of the federal government were
delegated by the states," but has asserted affratively that it
"is emphatically and truly a government of the people," that it
"in form and in substance emanates from them."
If Amphyction chuses [sic] to construe the affiative
assertion made by the court into a negative assertion that "the
powers of the government were not delegated by the states," I
shall not contest the point with him unless he uses the word
"states" in a different sense from that which a great part of his
argument imports. In what sense, let me ask, does he use the
word? Does he mean the people inhabiting the territory which
constitutes a state? Or does he mean the government of that
territory? If the former, the controversy is at an end. He concurs
with the opinion he arraigns. The Supreme Court cannot be
mistaken. It has said, not indeed in the same words, but in
substance, precisely what he says. The powers of the
government were delegated, according to that opinion, by the
people assembled in convention in their respective states, and
deciding, as all admit, for their respective states.
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If Amphyction means to assert, as I suppose he does, that the
powers of the general government were delegated by the state
legislatures, then I say that his assertion is contradicted by the
words of the constitution, and by the fact[s of ratification]. 1"
The powers of the general government were in no way "delegated by
the state legislatures."" 9 So much for "We the States." That said,
the Court never denied that those powers were delegated by
"'states' in a different sense."70 If "Amphictyon" thinks the Court
meant to deny that the delegated powers came from "the people
inhabiting that territory which constitutes a state," then "the
controversy is at an end."' 7 ' Instead, the Court's critic "concurs with
the opinion he arraigns."172 The Supreme Court agrees that the
"powers of the government were delegated, according to that
opinion, by the people assembled in convention in their respective
states."' So much for "We the Peoples."
Furthermore, "A Friend of the Union" goes on to turn
"Amphictyon's" reliance on Madison's famous "Report of 1800" on
its head to make the same point. 74 He then makes the point yet
again by declaring that the McCulloch opinion accords "precisely"
with "Amphictyon's" apparent concession, "That the constitution
was submitted to conventions elected by the people of the several
states; that is to say, to the states themselves in their highest
political and sovereign authority."' Marshall pounces upon this
statement to exclaim, "He admits that the powers of the general
government were not delegated by the state governments, but by
the people of the respective states. That is the very proposition
advanced by the Supreme Court, and advanced in terms too plain
to be mistaken."17 6
Nor does Marshall retreat from this position later on. As put
forth by "A Friend of the Constitution:"
168. Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 84-85.
169. Id. at 85.
170. Id. at 84.
171. Id. at 84-85.
172. Id. at 85.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 87.
175. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 194.
176. Id. at 88-89.
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The counsel for the state of Maryland, we are told, contended
that the constitution was the act of sovereign states, as
contradistinguished from the people. In opposition to this
proposition, the court maintained that the constitution is not the
act of the state governments, but of the people of the states. In
the course of this argument, the term-the people-without any
annexation, is frequently used; but never in a sense excluding
the idea that the people were divided into distinct societies, or
indicating the non-existence of the states.
177
Typical of his more nationalistic emphasis, "A Friend of the
Constitution" does follow this assertion with a forceful discussion
that "the people of the United States" nonetheless have a "national
existence."178 The United States goes to "war as a nation." 79 The
Constitution states that a Senator must be a "citizen of the United
States."80 Fairly read, however, these and other examples indicate
that Marshall has moved on to speak of the nature of the republic
after it has been constituted--"a nation; but a nation composed of
states in many, though not in all, respects, sovereign"-rather than
the nature of the popular sovereigns who did the constituting. 8 '
Marshall, moreover, introduces his examples in immediate response
not to the founding sovereignty argument made by Maryland, but
to "Hampden's" accusation that the Supreme Court meant to claim
that the Constitution did not recognize the states.
182
Striking in all of this is Marshall's willingness to accept that
multiple founding sovereigns means constitutional compact-albeit
in a qualitatively more limited way than compact theory usually
connotes. "A Friend to the Union" does it in the course of tossing
"Amphictyon's" use of Madison's landmark"Report of 1800" back in
his face. The Report grew out of the failure of the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, which drew censure in the place of the
177. Id.
178. Id. at 194-95.
179. Id. at 195.
180. Id.
181. Id. Earlier Marshall cites with approval Madison's assertion in The FederalistNo. 39
that the Constitution (as opposed to its ratification) is neither "'national" nor "federal," "but
a composition of both.' Id. at 194 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
182. Id. at 194.
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expected endorsement from other state legislatures. To explain and
defend Virginia's position, Madison served as principal author of a
resolution that the legislature subsequently adopted. According to
Marshall, "Amphictyon" misread the Report to assert standard "We
the States" compact theory.113 Marshall denies this. Quoting from
the Report, he (rightly) invokes Madison as asserting a compact
among the several peoples:
The report continues: "Whatever different constructions of the
term 'states' in the resolution may have been entertained, all
will at least concur in that last mentioned" (the people
composing those political societies in their highest sovereign
capacity) "because," the report proceeds, "in that sense the
constitution was submitted to the 'states.' In that sense the
states ratified it; and in that sense they are consequently parties
to the compact from which the powers of the federal government
result."184
According to Marshall, "[tihis celebrated report, then, concurs
exactly with the Supreme court, in the opinion that the constitution
is the act of the people."8 5
No less striking, though more subtle, is the concurrence from
Marshall's second alter ego. This appears as "A Friend of the
Constitution" floats an argument, elaborated later, that the
Constitution is not "a league, or a contract of alliance between
the states, sovereign and independent," as were the Articles of
Confederation.' After sketching the distinction, Marshall blandly
adds that "The people of the United States have certainly a right,
if they choose to exercise it, to reduce their government [back] to a
league." "' In isolation, this could mean that "We the People" could
reemerge for the purpose of unfounding the national government
and reconstituting what Marshall viewed as thirteen sovereign
state governments joined by treaty. No small conceptual problem
with this reading would be explaining how what had been a single
founding entity could use its sovereign authority to dismember, if
183. Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 88.
184. Id. at 87-88.
185. Id. at 88.
186. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 199.
187. Id.
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not extinguish, itself. But even if that problem could be overcome,
there remains the Report of 1800. Given Marshall's earlier position,
a more coherent interpretation would take Marshall to say that as
the thirteen sovereign peoples entered a compact establishing a
true (though limited) national government, so too could they
dissolve the pact and return to the status quo ante.
At this point turn, as Marshall does, to the second phase of his
defense. Here each set of essays answers the charge that McCulloch
never meant to imply that its use of "the people" as the founding
agents meant the national populace as opposed to those within the
states. Once more the initial treatment by "A Friend to the Union"
deserves a fuller quotation:
Amphyction adds, that those conventions represented "not
the whole mass of the people of the United States, but the
people only within the limits of the respective sovereign states."
"The individuality of the several states was still kept up, &c."
And who has ever advanced the contrary opinion? Who has
ever said that the convention of Pennsylvania represented the
people of any other state, or decided for any other state than
itself? [Who has ever been so absurd as to deny that "the
individuality of the several states was still kept up?" Not the
supreme court certainly. Such opinions may be imputed to the
judges, by those who, finding nothing to censure in what is
actually said, and being predetermined to censure, create odious
phantoms which may be very proper objects of detestation, but
which bear no resemblance to any thing that has proceeded from
the court.
Nothing can be more obvious than that in every part of the
opinion, the terms "state" and "state sovereignties" are used in
reference to the state governments, as contradistinguished from
the people of the states. The words of the federal convention,
requesting that the constitution might "be submitted to a
convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people
thereof," are quoted; and it is added, 'This mode of proceeding
was adopted; and by the convention, by congress, and by the
state legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the people."
That is, to the people of the respective states; for that is the
mode of proceeding said to have been recommended by the
convention, and to have been adopted.-After noticing that they
assembled in their respective states, the opinion adds: "And
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where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer
was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which
separate the states, and of compounding the American people
into one mass."
Yet Amphyction affects to be controverting the reasoning of
the supreme court when he says that the convention of our state
[Virginia] did not represent all the people of the United States,
that "the individuality of the several states was still kept up."
Disregarding altogether the language of the court, he ascribes
to the judges an opinion which they say, "no political dreamer
was ever wild enough to think of."' 88
Note that Marshall speaks about more than mere geographic
necessity to account for the several conventions. Instead, the
conventions represented not "the people of any other state"'8 9 nor
"decided for any other state than itself,"9 ' but rather "the people of
the respective states," as reflected in the plan of ratification.19 '
What held generally, held for Virginia, whose convention "did not
represent all the people of the United States."' 92 To say otherwise
would be "controverting the reasoning of the supreme court."'9 It
follows that the better reading of McCulloch presumed that the
"individuality of the states" was kept up in the sense, as seen
earlier, of states as "the people composing those political societies
in their highest sovereign capacity."94 According to the Court, the
conventions reflected different sovereign peoples, not the logistical
difficulty of a grand national convention. So much for "We the
People."
"A Friend to the Union," the later alter ego, agrees in this phase
of the argument as well. Marshall notes Roane's contention that,
"The constitution of the United States was not adopted by the
people of the United States as one people, it was adopted by the
several states,"'95 adding that "Hampden" "proceeds to show that
188. Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 89-90.
189. Id. at 89.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 90.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 87.
195. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 197.
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the constitution was adopted by the people of the several states
acting in separate conventions."'96 To this Marshall replies, "This
is precisely what the court had previously said."'97 Continuing,
Marshall, as before, accuses his accuser of willfully misconstruing
McCulloch's obvious meaning with the claim that the opinion's use
of "the people" meant national populace. It did not.
The opinion cannot be inspected without perceivingthat these
words are not quoted, as "importing" in the constitution, "the
people of Americain exclusion of those of the several states," but
as importing the people, in exclusion of their governments.
The court then has not denied, but has affirmed, that the
constitution was adopted by the people acting as states.9 '
This lengthy, though highly abridged, excursion might end here
but for the one passage that appears to stand apart. Given the
conventional wisdom, it is also the passage that has received more
attention than anything considered so far. In his penultimate essay,
"A Friend of the Constitution" takes up Roane's argument that the
Supreme Court lacked the jurisdiction to settle the Bank
controversy. This apparently follows, Marshall states, because of
"Hampden's" fundamentally erroneous reliance on classic compact
theory, specifically "that our constitution is a mere league, or a
compact, between the several state governments, and the general
government." 99 Since treaties or contracts among sovereigns,
cannot be resolved by the contracting parties, the Court, as the
adjudicatory division of one of these parties, has no authority to
settle the dispute. Pacta sunt servanda, but not by any of the
governments who made the pact.
Marshall replies that this type of analysis has no place because
the constitution of the United States is not an alliance or league
between independent sovereigns; nor a compact between the
government of the union, and those of the states; but is itself a




199. Id. at 201.
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people, acting by convention assembled in and for their
respective states.Y
Even just to this point, the reference to "whole" American people
indicates a nationalist shift in tone. But in light of all that has come
before, perhaps the most prudent reading would view Marshall as
simply stating that, in fact, the entire national populace did sign on
to the Constitution, even though they did so as the several founding
sovereigns. From here he first takes aim at the idea that the
Constitution is a treaty or forms a league, in part precisely because
"We the States" did not create it. 201
Then comes the more problematic language. "A Friend" turns his
sights from the Constitution as "league" or "treaty" to the
Constitution as "compact" or "contract,"-or, more strictly speaking,
"compact theory." Marshall notes that such agreements require
parties. But where are they? The federal government "can certainly
not be a party to the instrument by which it was created."20 2 Nor
"have the state governments made this instrument."' 3 To the
contrary, it "is the act of people themselves, and not the act of their
governments." 4 So far, perhaps, so good. But then comes the
language:
There is then no agreement formed between the government of
the United States and those of the states. Our constitution is not
a compact. It is the act of a single party. It is the act of the
people of the United States, assembling in their respective
states, and adopting a government for the whole nation. 5
Has Marshall, almost in passing, abandoned his careful defenses of
"We the Peoples", and let his true nationalist colors show? Perhaps.
Or perhaps he has simply gotten carried away in his refutation of
Roane, pushing back harder because he has been pushed himself.
There is no denying that the "single party" language does not sit
easily with Marshall's repeated and lengthy apologia for ratification
200. Id. at 202.
201. Id. at 202.
202. I& at 203.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
1378 [Vol. 43:1339
REVISIONS IN NEED OF REVISING
by "the people of the respective states." All things considered, the
most plausible reconciliation must be that Marshall means no more
than his repeated assertions that no compact exists among the
various governments, state and national. The Constitution is in no
way a governmental compact."' More daringly, it is the act of a
single party when considering governments as the only potential
candidates for entering the contract. From this governmental
perspective, neither those parties, nor the resulting contract,
exists. What does exist is the single party of the American people.
But from the perspective not of governments, but of founding
sovereigns, what was the single party, the people of the United
States, becomes a different sort of party, better understood as
multiple: the people of tl]e different states meeting in convention
expressing the highest sovereignty of those states. To say Marshall
changed his conception of founding sovereignty at the eleventh
hour, therefore, is to commit a type of categorical error. Reconciling
Marshall's language in this way has the virtue of preserving his
equally striking acceptance of the Report of 1800's view of the
Constitution as a more limited compact among the sovereign
peoples. More importantly, the interpretation offered here preserves
everything else Marshall wrote on the issue in the two sets of
essays. Yet even if the "single party" cannot in the end be squared
with everything else, the choice then becomes to privilege a single
sentence over page upon page of clear and close analysis. Failing
that, "We the Peoples" should prevail after all.
C. Marshall's Conclusions, Doctrinal and Beyond
Marshall's endorsement of "We the Peoples" may confound
expectations, but he will confound expectations still further in
denying that state government benefits as a result. This latter set
of expectations flows from the geographic divisions on which
ratification by several sovereign peoples rest. It stands to reason
that the people within a given state would not lightly delegate
authority to a national government when their own government
would presumably be closer, more responsive, and focused on
that particular people's character, needs, and desires. Out of this
206. Id. at 197-203.
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supposition arises an array of doctrinal conclusions that
Brokenbrough, Roane, Thomas, and countless advocates in between
have put forward. Grants of federal power should be construed
narrowly."' State immunities should be presumed.0 8 Federal bars
to reserved state authority should rarely be inferred.0 9
Yet a 'We the Peoples" understanding need not go down this
path. The first clue is McCulloch itself, which famously features a
comparatively broad construction of federal power and justification
of an implicit federal bar to state taxation authority. Many
more indications come from Marshall's defense. One is the sheer
vehemence of the disagreement between Marshall on the one hand,
and "Amphictyon" and "Hampden" on the other,210 given that
each of them at some point relies on the "We the Peoples" model,
especially Marshall and Roane. One further indication, of course,
is the substantive disagreement between them, both in elabo-
rating McCulloch and addressing questions beyond it.211 No less
importantly, the essays indicate why a less state-oriented path
should be available. Ratification may have tracked state borders, he
reminds, but it also reflected fundamental dissatisfaction with
the state governments themselves. As is central to Founding
scholarship, this dissatisfaction led precisely to approval of the
Constitution by state conventions rather than state governments.
For Marshall, what matters about ratification by "We the Peoples"
was not geographic division, but this more profound and immediate
feature of the process.
That said, Marshall's statements on the matter accord with the
view that while the choice of creation myth does not compel any
doctrinal conclusions, it can point toward them. "A Friend to the
Union" tends to emphasize the connection. Marshall's opportunity
comes in response to "Amphictyon's" claim "that the constitution
ought to receive the same construction, whether its powers were
delegated by the people or the states."2 12 Marshall responds that he
207. See supra note 39.
208. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
210. See generally DEFENSE, supra note 102.
211. See supra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
212. Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 82.
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"shall not controvert the proposition,"213 but indicates his dis-
agreement anyway. "Amphictyon," Marshall argues, cannot be
serious that a particular account of the Founding has no connection
to doctrine because of "the extreme importance he attaches to his
theory [of the Founding]."214 The same point about attaching
extreme importance to founding sovereignty, of course, could be said
about "A Friend to the Union." Continuing, Marshall chides that
"[i]f the powers of the general government were to be in no degree
affected by the source from which they were derived, it is not easy
to comprehend how [in Amphictyon's view] the liberty of the
American people can depend on the adoption of one opinion or the
other [about who established the Constitution]."215
Turning to a specific conclusion, Marshall denies his opponent's
argument that the state legislatures can canvass or remonstrate
against Congress or the President because the state governments
created them. This does not follow because the right "to remon-
strate against the abuse of power, must reside in all who are
affected by those measures..., whether it was delegated by them or
not."21 But Marshall also suggests that there is a connection after
all. Coming at the problem the other way, "Amphictyon's" error on
the right to remonstrate demonstrates his error in asserting "We
the States" theory. Marshall pushes his adversary's argument to
show that if it is correct, that the state governments have a power
to remonstrate as founding sovereigns, it follows that the people of
the states cannot do so separately or individually. Yet since "this
conclusion be false, as it must be, the premises," that is that the
state governments created the federal government, "are false
also. "
217
Later, "A Friend of the Constitution" does deny a necessary link
between the process of creation and what is created. "The character
of a government depends on its constitution" he stresses, "not on its
being adopted by the people acting in a single body, or in single
bodies."21 Running one direction: "The kingdom of Great Britain
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 82-83.
216. Id. at 83.
217. Id.
218. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 197.
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and Ireland is a consolidated kingdom. Yet it formerly consisted
of three distinct kingdoms-England, Scotland, & Ireland; and
this union was effected by their several parliaments, acting
separately in each kingdom."21 9 "They the Kingdoms," in other
words, established a unified, national state. Going the other way,
the 1792 French Convention almost established a federal republic,
which would not have been less so "because it was adopted by the
representatives of the whole people, acting in mass."220 These
examples, however, do not belie the relevance of adoption to result,
especially given that one remained hypothetical. Aside from his
treatment of "Amphictyon" for disingenuously denying any
connection, Marshall simply devotes too much effort and passion to
getting the creation myth right to suppose that he is merely
concerned with historical accuracy.
Nor does Marshall always see the connection as merely relevant.
In at least one instance, he treats an issue as if the type of creation
myth one accepts does necessarily determine the outcome. That
instance is the same one that occasioned his often misconstrued
"single party" rhetoric.221 Recall that "Hampden" accused the
Supreme Court of "deciding a cause not within its jurisdiction."222
This charge, as noted, was based on the proposition that when "We
the People" created the Constitution, they did no more than enter
into a league or compact. Either treaty or contract law principles
would therefore apply in resolving disputes among the parties.
Under these bodies of law, the settlement of disputes fell to the
parties to the agreement, not the court of a government that (under
treaty law) was a mere creation of the league or (under contract
law) one of the interested parties 2 '
"A Friend of the Constitution" greets this argument grumbling
that this "last accusation" seems so imaginative that it somehow
escaped the learned counsel for Maryland.224 He does not, however,
speculate that "We the States" could have agreed to make the
Supreme Court the final arbiter of controversies, a choice along the
219. Id. at 197-98.
220. Id. at 198.
221. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
222. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 200.
223. Id. at 201-02.
224. Id. at 201.
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lines of the decision by England, Scotland, and Ireland to create a
consolidated kingdom.2  Instead, as also noted, Marshall concen-
trates on demonstrating that the Constitution cannot possibly be a
league or compact among sovereign states because it was "We the
Peoples"-not sovereign governments-that created it. 226 This is
because the several peoples, not to mention one national people,
could not have entered into the type of agreement that would
automatically subject disputes between the governments they
established to treaty or contract principles. As "Hampden's"
argument held, those bodies of law apply to an agreement's original
parties. Since no government was a party in the creation of the
Constitution, the jurisdictional objection must fail. More
importantly, it fails as a direct function of Marshall's understanding
of who created the Constitution.
But whether Marshall views founding sovereignty as on occasion
dispositive or, more often, probative, the large question remains:
what results does he derive in light of the creation myth he puts
forward? To coin a phrase, happily the question is not of an
intricacy proportioned to its interest. Nothing about his fidelity to
"We the Peoples" prevented Marshall from rejecting the state-
oriented alternatives placed before him in McCulloch. To the
contrary, his understanding of ratification in those terms pushed
him just the other way.
So well-known and expounded are McCulloch's reasoning and
results that they do not need elaborate attention here. For
present purposes, it suffices to note first that McCulloch itself
rejected Maryland's argument against a narrow construction of
Congressional power. To do this, Marshall famously deployed the
doctrine of implied powers, then bolstered it with an expansive
reading of the "Necessary and Proper Clause."' 7 Next, the Court
rejected Maryland's argument that the Constitution established no
bar against a state taxing a federal instrumentality that Congress
225. Treaties that establish a transnational arbiter are today commonplace. See, e.g.,
European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 11 (Nov. 1, 1998), available at
http'l/conventions.coe.intttreaty/ENf/reaties/html/005.htm. Such treaties can even establish
jurisdiction for disputes between the original parties and other institutions that the treaty
creates in addition to the court. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 1 C.M.L.R. 573.
226. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 202-03.
227. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,404-24 (1819).
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created.22 Here, only a little less famously, Marshall relied on the
destructive potential of the taxing power, together with the
argument that the Maryland legislature did not represent the rest
of the country, to hold that "the states have no power, by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control,
the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by congress."229
Though current scholarship may debate just how nationalist
Marshall was in the abstract, or from a modern viewpoint,
McCulloch still merits its reputation for denying the state-centered
reasoning placed before it. It was just for this reason, rather than
simply validating the Bank, that McCulloch was among the most
controversial opinions that the Marshall Court handed down."0
More to the point, Marshall in no way retreated from McCulloch's
positions even as he made clear that the opinion never meant to
adopt anything other than a "We the Peoples" account of founding
sovereignty. No sooner does "A Friend to the Union" issue his first
essay, which set forth that founding account, than he launches a
second and last article devoted almost entirely to defending the
Court's reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause."' Marshall
accordingly contends that the Court correctly rejected the
"restricted interpretation" that would have limited federal power
and instead applied a "fair interpretation," that facilitated without
enlarging the grant of powers to Congress.232 Likewise, "A Friend
of the Constitution" similarly defended McCulloch's reasoning
against the more sophisticated "Hampden." In this far more wide-
ranging and in-depth response, Marshall once again repeats but
does not retreat. To note one theme, Marshall denies that the Court
ever contended for "additional" powers that were never granted, as
opposed to "incidental" powers implicit in the grant.23 3 Of relevance
here is not just Marshall's careful defense, which often includes
quoting long passages from McCulloch itself.24 It is also that
Marshall mounts this defense against opponents to whom he,
228. Id. at 424-36.
229. Id. at 436.
230. WHITE, supra note 77, at 27.
231. Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 91-105.
232. Id. at 92-93.
233. E.g., Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 171
(distinguishing "incidental" and "additional" in a dictionary sense).
234. E.g., id. at 182-83 (quoting McCulloch) (citation omitted).
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at various points, attributes the same conception of founding
sovereignty that he himself holds. 5
It might be objected, of course, that Marshall was "nationalist"
only in the context of 1819. A "We the, Peoples" view might once
have been consistent with rejecting extreme antebellum "states'
rights" challenges. Nearly 200 years later, the conception could only
support today's more "modest" federalism claims, and still less
coexist with the federal colossus that has emerged since the Civil
War and New Deal. On this view, McCulloch's treatment of federal
authority sits more comfortably alongside United States v. Lopez21'
than Wickard v. Filburn." To the extent McCulloch's analysis
followed from Marshall's view of founding sovereignty, so much the
worse for Wickard.
This objection falls short for a number of reasons. First, it is not
strictly accurate even on its own terms. Aspects of McCulloch's
judgment have actually proven more nationalistic than the nation
has since been prepared to accept, and not because of the last few
years of "states' rights" jurisprudence. With James v. Dravo
Contracting Co.," s the Court "decisively rejected the argument
that any state regulation which indirectly regulates the Federal
Government's activity is unconstitutional."" 9 Beyond this, and as
more than a few post-New Deal scholars have argued, remaining
faithful to Marshall's principles requires applying them in light of
the nation's changed circumstances rather than merely replicating
a specific application that he made or would have made. Here,
classically, Marshall's analysis of the Commerce Clause supports
Wickard, not because Marshall would have decided the case the
same way had he gotten it in 1824,24 but because his reasoning
235. See, e.g., Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 88-89;
Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 194.
236. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
237. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
238. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
239. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(discussing James). Earlier, Justice Holmes presaged this resultwriting in dissent that: "The
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
240. The year of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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supports it given the consolidation of the national economy since
then.24
1
A more fundamental problem with the temporal objection is that
it remains unproven and perhaps unprovable. Certainly scholars on
the left242 and right248 commonly identify Marshall's jurisprudence
as continuing to cut in nationalist directions. So long as this
remains the case, Marshall's first principles regarding founding
sovereignty likewise remain a vital part of the results he cashed out
as currently understood. Considered from the opposite direction,
Marshall's views on who established the Constitution cannot be
consigned to the "states' rights" persuasion unless the judgments
and rationales he espoused can as well. One doesn't have to see
Marshall as a New Dealer to concede that his views on ratification
prefaced doctrines that can still support national authority and,
even more to the point, oppose claims of state sovereignty.
4
On a more fundamental level, moreover, the preface is the story.
Marshall's explications of McCulloch make clear not just that his
"We the Peoples" understanding appeared side by side with what
for him were nationalist rejections of any array of state sovereignty
claims. He further suggests why the "We the Peoples" approach
broadly supports such denials.
Marshall sought to remind Americans that the "sovereign" state
governments had acquitted themselves so poorly under the Articles
of Confederation that the need for constitutional reform had become
overwhelming. The approval for such reform ultimately fell not to
the state governments that had occasioned the need for change, but
to the sovereign peoples of the respective states, meeting in
241. For one of the most recent and rigorous versions of this type of argument, see
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV.
395 (1995).
242. See, e.g., Eisgruber, supra note 2; Eisgruber, supra note 8.
243. See, e.g., John Yoo, McCulloch v. Maryland, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONALTRAGEDIEs 241 (William N. Eskeridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
244. Cf. WHITE,supra note 96, at 486. This point goes double when one recalls that judicial
review as comprehended during Marshall's day was extremely deferential to exercises of
Congressional authority. More broadly, if the more constrained nationalism of Marshal's day
suggests that his jurisprudence supports recent "states' rights" decisions as restoring a
previous federalism balance, the more constrained idea of judicial review during the same
period undercuts those decisions from a separation of powers perspective. See Kramer, supra
note 2, at 74-128. It is difficult to see how the former historical point, if accepted, should
count as a limit on modem analysis, but the latter one should not.
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convention. For similar reasons, the nature of the reform that the
people approved became a limited but genuine national govern-
ment that greatly curtailed state authority. For present purposes,
what matters is less the specific solutions and borders the
resulting Constitution attempted to map out. Instead, it is
Marshall's reminder that the most important aspect of ratification
was not geography after all, but the reasons for ratification-
substantive and procedural-in the first place.
Marshall's invocation of the "critical period"245 comes late in the
"Friend of the Constitution" essays in immediate response to
reliance by "Hampden" on the "We the States" compact theory. The
key passage, interestingly, begins as a prospective warning against
returning to anArticles of Confederation regime, though eventually
moves back to note the choices facing the country at the time.
"[L] ook back," Marshall pleads,
to that awful and instructive period of our history which
preceded the adoption of our constitution. These states were
then truly sovereign, and were bound together only by a league.
Examine with attention, for the subject deserves all your
attention, the consequences of such a system. They are truly
depicted in the Federalist, especially in the 15th No. of that
work The author thus commences his catalogue of the ills it had
brought upon us-"We may indeed, with propriety, be said to
have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation.
There is scarcely any thing that can wound the pride, or degrade
the character, of an independent people, which we do not
experience." And he concludes his long and dark detail of those
ills with saying,-"To shorten an enumeration of particulars
which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in
general be demanded, what indication is there of national
disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a
community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we
are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our
public misfortunes." 6
245. ROBERTA. EAST, JOHN QUINCYADAMS: THE CRTICALYEARS, 1785-1794, at85 (1962)
(quoting Adams).
246. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 199-200
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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The grim enumeratioh in The Federalist No. 15, which was
written by Alexander Hamilton,4 7 to which Marshall refers,
includes: state failure to enforce national treaty obligations; state
failure to pay off war debts to allies; exclusion from the Mississippi;
a weak national defense; a lack of public credit; British refusal to
evacuate the forts in the Northwest; national commerce in disarray;
disrespect by foreign nations; low values for improved land; and
scarce private credit.248
This list refers more to problems of disunity than, what scholars
since Gordon Wood have emphasized, instances of democratic
excess within states. 249 As David Golove has pointed out, these
difficulties resulted from problems of collective agency.2 0 This
emphasis is not surprising given Marshall's immediate concern
with refuting Roane's extreme compact theory and The Federalist's
early concern with lamenting national weakness. The second order
of concerns, however, also makes an appearance. Failure to live up
to treaty obligations, for example, refers to the states' refusal to
insure payment to British creditors and to compensate loyalists
for wartime confiscations. Each count is an example of state
legislatures declining to take measures to protect the property
rights of unpopular minorities. 5' More broadly, Marshall's generic
reference to The Federalist thereby includes famous catalogues of
the excessive, unclear, and even despotic measures that the states
enacted within their borders during this periodY2
Common to each set of concerns, the state governments had
demonstrated that they could no longer be relied upon without a
radical change in the system, nor could they be trusted to effect that
radical change. Marshall alludes to the results and the process:
247. For an excellent account of Hamilton's own consistent nationalism, see David
McGowan, Ethos in Law and History:Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme
Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 760-819 (2000).
248. THiFEDERAISTNO. 15, at 106-07 (AlexanderHamilton)(ClintonRossitered., 1961).
249. WOOD, supra note 10, at 391-429; see also MORGAN, supra note 10, at 265-67; RAKOVE,
supra note 10, at 28-31.
250. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1098-99 (2000).
251. Id. at 1102-27.
252. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-13 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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Such was the situation to which these states were brought, in
four years of peace, by their league. To change it into an
effective government, or to fall to pieces from the weight of its
constituent parts, & the weakness of its cement, was the
alternative presented to the people of the United States. The
wisdom and patriotism of our country chose the former.255
Again emphasizing disunity, "A Friend of the Constitution"
observes that the ills brought about by a league with a true "We the
States""' pedigree threatened to "fall to pieces." As his earlier
remarks imply, neither did the constituent parts of that league
have exemplary records internally. An alternative was presented,
and accepted, by "the people of the United States." Forming a
nation through the state governments had become untenable. But
neither did it come about through one consolidated people, easy as
it might be to equate a more unified solution with a unified
sovereign. Instead, as Marshall had been at pains to point out, "the
people of the United States" is properly understood to mean the
peoples of the several states in their highest sovereign capacity,
assembled in conventions. It was, in short, citizen dismay with their
own governments that functioned as a principle that opposed, and
could even trump, local allegiance based upon geographical division.
In this way, Marshall accords with the conventional wisdom after
all. Older accounts of the Founding commonly emphasized the
theme of state frustration of national unity in much the same
manner as "A Friend of the Constitution." 5 Nor has the validity of
this view been challenged. To the contrary, modern scholarship
continues to take it as a given that the foreign policy ills that
Hamilton enumerated under the state-centered Articles of
Confederation were a principal reason leading to constitutional
253. Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 200.
254. It should be pointed out that Marshall, and Hamilton for that matter, exaggerate the
sovereign independence of the states during this period. See RIcHARD M. MORRIS, THE
FORGING OF THE UNION 55-79 (1987) (asserting that state sovereignty had been greatly
constrained even under the Articles of Confederation). One reason why Marshall and
Hamilton may have overstated the matter would have been to contrast the greater anarchy
under a previous era of considerable state sovereignty with the unity under a Constitution
in which the position of the states was significantly reduced.
255. E.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWERV. STATE POWER 21-
30(1913).
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reform and in shaping it subsequently." 6 Of these ills, three were
especially pressing. First, Congress lacked the authority to retaliate
against British trade restrictions. Second, state legislatures refused
to comply with the 1783 Treaty of Paris that concluded the war
between the United States and Britain. Finally, Spain closed New
Orleans and the lower Mississippi to American navigation. 7 In the
absence of an effective national government, the states either could
not address these matters collectively, or worse, sought to promote
their own concerns at the expense of the national interest. Professor
Golove nicely captures this latter phenomenon in noting that
conflicts over national and state authority "were recurrent under
the Confederation ... [as] ... states' rights proponents did succeed
in creating controversy and uncertainty and sometimes even in
seriously subverting Congress's foreign policy initiatives-indeed,
so severely as to place the peace of the nation in jeopardy."258
What modern scholarship has added to the picture is a new
appreciation for the minor theme in Marshall's analysis-
dissatisfaction with the state governments domestically. As Jack
Rakove has written, "[h]ow the states were responding to this task
[of coping] with the aftermath of a prolonged revolutionary struggle
that had placed so enormous a strain on American society ...
became, by 1787, as important an element in the movement for
constitutional reform as the more conspicuous failings of
Congress."259 The founding generations assessment of this
response, to put it mildly, was not good. In one state after another,
it seemed, legislatures were enacting ill-advised, or even tyrannical,
laws-laws that infringed on contractual obligations, confiscated
property, transferred wealth through inflationary schemes, and
limited trial by jury. No less troubling, it became apparent to some
256. See, e.g., FELIX GILBERT, To THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1961); MARKS, supra note 81; RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED (1967); PAUL A. VARG, FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS (1963). For a superb account focusing on the treaty power, see Golove, supra note
250, at 1102-49. For a summary, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2112-20 (1999).
257. RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 26-27.
258. Golove, supra note 250 at 1103. Golove specifically refers to clashes with regard to
the treaty power.
259. RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 29.
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that these results came about not because state government was
unresponsive to local desires, but because it was if anything too
responsive.6 As Gordon Wood put it, "In the 1780's the Americans'
inveterate suspicion and jealousy of political power, once con-
centrated almost exclusively on the Crown and its agents, was
transferred to the various state legislatures. 261
However critiqued,262 essentially this story has remained at the
center of modern understandings of the Founding for several
decades. So entrenched has it become that it has arguably
muscled aside the older theme of national disunity even as it
complements it. 264 More importantly, the account can be extended
too far, to imply that the Constitution represented some sort of
repudiation of republican self-government, especially at the state
level, rather than an attempt to save republicanism from itself on
both the state and national levels.26 All that granted, the core of
the story remains. Contrary to certain suddenly popular accounts,
the reform movement that led to the Constitution was not simply
about promoting majoritarian government. Rather, in fundamental
ways, it was about responding to perceived excesses bymajoritarian
state governments in foreign and domestic affairs. A national
government that operated on individuals, a revived commitment to
bicameralism, and an enhanced and more independent judiciary
were just some of the familiar mechanisms that resulted.266
And conventions. Theoretically, the state governments could have
atoned for their previous misdeeds and effected the necessary
reforms themselves. An immediate stumbling block in this regard
260. For a summary, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725, 1758-71 (1996).
261. WOOD, supra note 10, at 409.
262. For critiques of Wood's thesis and the so-called"republican synthesis" it heralded, see
Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1594-97 (1987);
DanielT. Rodgers,Republicanism: The Careerofa Concept, 79J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992); Robert
E. Shalhope,Republicanism and EarlyAmerican Historiography, 39WM. &MARYQ. (3d ser.)
334(1982);Forum, The Creation oftheAmerican Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views
and Reviews, 44 Wu. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 549 (1987).
263. Flaherty, supra note 10, at 535-49.
264. Gordon Wood's foundational Creation of the American Republic set the tone for
subsequent scholarship in barely touching upon foreign affairs concerns.
265. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 35-44.
266. For a classic account, see WOOD, supra note 10, especially at 430-564. For a widely
regarded updating and elaboration, see RAKOVE, supra note 10, passim.
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was Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, which provided
that no alteration could be made unless it "be agreed to in a
Congress of the United States, and be afterwardA confirmed by the
legislatures of every state."26 As events would later bear out,
neither Article XIII nor its unanimity requirement had to be an
insurmountable barrier if reformers convinced enough of the nation
to ignore them. Not even the Articles, therefore, prevented the state
governments from acting as the agents of reform.
Yet reform came not through the state governments, but through
state conventions. Especially to the reformers, the difference was
critical. Developing what had once been a legally deficient body
from English constitutional history, Americans came to see spe-
cially elected conventions as more legitimate and representative
than an ordinary legislature. Conventions could therefore serve as
the source of constitutional rules that bound legislatures precisely
because they embodied "the people" more fundamentally-as
Marshall put it "the people composing those political societies in
their highest sovereign capacity."268 As Wood has written, this quest
for a manifestation of the people that was more fundamental than
ordinary government in part reflected a general "mistrust of all men
and all institutions set above the people-at-large."269
But reliance on conventions further reflected more specific
dissatisfaction with the behavior of the particular state govern-
ments at hand.7 Conventions, therefore, became the mechanism
for constitutional reform within certain states, with Massachusetts
leading the way in 1780. For similar reasons, conventions became
the device set forth in Article VII of the Federal Constitution.2 71 In
practical terms, they responded to the Federalist calculation that
perhaps the same state governments that had created the need
for the Constitution, and would lose power in consequence, might
not look kindly on the proposed solution. 2 More profoundly, the
state conventions allowed the Constitution's defenders to "pose as
267. ART. CONFED., art. XIII (1781).
268. Marshall, A Friend to the Union, in DEFENSE, supra note 102, at 87.
269. WOOD, supra note 10, at 328.
270. Id.
271. U.S. CONST., art. VII, cl. 1.
272. See RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 101.
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champions of the people's superiority to their governments."273
Even relatively obscure Federalists could argue that "all power is
in the people, and not in the state governments."274 Less obscure
allies like Madison further saw that the Constitution ratified in this
way, "would rest on stronger foundations than all those state
constitutions that had not been framed by special conventions ....
On this basis," he could conclude, such a constitution could make
"inroads" into state power, and the ensuing conflicts "could be more
readily resolved in favor of the federal government."275
Somewhat surprisingly, the same historians who have done so
much to recapture the significance of conventions have not closely
examined the question of whether the conventions that did the
actual ratifying were understood to embody one national people or
the several peoples of distinct political societies. That task has been
most thoroughly considered by a legal scholar, Henry Monaghan.
Relying both on constitutional structure and contemporary
expressions, above all Madison's, Monaghan concludes that -"[a]
significant number of Americans simultaneously held-in varying
mixtures and intensities-some concept of a 'We the People' of the
United States and (more importantly for my argument) some
concept of'We the People' of Delaware, and so on."276 To what extent
Monaghan's measured answer captures the Founding is another,
273. MORGAN, supra note 10, at 281.
274. MACLAmN, 4 ELLIOTS DEBATES 161 (1941).
275. RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 101.
276. Monaghan, supra note 13, at 138. That said, Monaghan's assessment does not
purport to characterize ratification only, but also understandings of the resulting
government, including the process for future higher lawmaking in Article V. In this regard,
Monaghan rightly invokes Madison's famous conclusion that the "constitutional order [is]
'neither wholly national nor wholly federal.'" Id. at 139 (quoting THE FEDERALISTNO. 39, at
243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961)). It should be noted, however, that on the
question ofratification, Madison clearly adopted a wholly federal position that might serve
as a textbook explication of the "We the Peoples" view. As the crucial passage goes:
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution
is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given
by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent
and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one
entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which
they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several
States, derived from the supreme authority in each State-the authority of the
people themselves. The act, therefore, establishingthe Constitutionwill not be
a national but a federal act.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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and far larger, question. What should be clear by now is that
Marshall defended McCulloch in terms of Monaghan's second
concept. Yet what should be no less clear is that in doing so,
Marshall emphasizes the separation of the various peoples from
their respective governments, rather than from one another.
CONCLUSION
Another large question is what any of this means for the
Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. Addressing the
matter adequately might well take a separate article fully as long
as this. Even then, Marshall's restored understanding of founding
sovereignty does not so much promise specific results as create
general presumptions. But the presumptions matter. As I have
sought to demonstrate, and as Marshall's essays demonstrate,
battles over competing creation myths have raged throughout our
constitutional history. If nothing else, the participants in this
ongoing debate agree with Madison that "the authority of a
constitution depended on the form of its promulgation," 277 whether
as rhetoric, symbol, or predictor of the sort of government that a
particular type of founding sovereign, or sovereigns, would create.
For now, suffice it to say that Marshall's articulation of a "We the
Peoples" genesis offers a way of thinking about the Founding that
suggests the Court has been drifting in the wrong direction.
The point holds for each type of case in which federalism claims
have been advanced. A "We the Peoples" account, as elaborated by
Marshall, cuts against the holdings in cases such as Lopez278 and
Morrison 279 in the same manner that it did in McCulloch itself. In
Marshall's hands, nothing about his understanding of sovereigns
expressing the will of distinct political societies defined by state
borders prevented him from opting for the less-restrictive approach
to the scope of federal power. From this starting point he did not
infer that the peoples of the states would have delegated power to
the new government parsimoniously. To the contrary, Marshall's
beliefs concerning the failures of the states' governments-the same
277. RAKOVE, supra note 10, at 101.
278. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
279. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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conviction that had lead to reliance on conventions-underscore
what for him was a more profound aspect of the Founding that cut
just the other way. This is not to say that Marshall would have
relied upon the distrust of state government that conventions
reflected to validate the New Deal. It is to claim, however, that
Marshall's take on ratification offers an analytic approach that
pushes against state-oriented conclusions notwithstanding its
recognition of state borders.
Still less does the Marshall brand of "We the Peoples" support
decisions that recognize barriers to federal authority that might
otherwise be exercised. Here cases such as Gregory v. Ashcroft,s8°
New York v. United States,"s Printz,8 s andAlden83 run up against
a threshold presumption precisely because they immunize the same
state actors that were bypassed by their own peoples in effecting
the constitutional reform that their own performance necessitated.
Even more than the decisions restricting federal power, doctrines
insulating state government from federal supervision run counter
to White's observation-which Marshall's understanding of the
founding sovereignty reflected-that his own decisions "did not so
much promote federal sovereignty as restrict state sovereignty."28 4
Finally, consider Term Limits itself. On one hand, Justice
Thomas sought to distinguish the case from McCulloch analysis on
the ground that a power to control term restrictions for federal
officers was not expressly, impliedly, or arguably delegated in the
Constitution."5 On the other, he reasoned that the case did not
implicate immunity barriers to federal power but instead turned on
the reservation of a founding power (to impose term restrictions) by
the sovereign peoples.2 8 Citing the Tenth Amendment, Thomas
assumed that the several peoples would have had every reason to
hold on to this power rather than give it away. Marshall's
conception of the same founding peoples, however, provides a set of
reasons that point back in favor of federal authority. The theme he
280. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
281. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
282. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1999).
283. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
284. WHITE, supra note 96, at 486.
285. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 853-54 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
286. Id. at 854-55.
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sounds, frustration with the state governments' interference with
national matters even more powerfully cuts against the dissent's
bland equation of a state government with its sovereign people
merely because the constitution that a particular people established
for their state created its government.287
In these ways McCulloch winds up a"nationalist,'--and certainly
not some sort of closet "states' rights"-decision after all. At the end
of the day it retains its traditional role even though its iconic
recap of the Founding turns out to reflect state boundaries more
profoundly than previously thought. If these unexpected twists
are not enough, the question of founding popular sovereignty may
have one more. Looking back, it may well be that the dominant
understanding of ratification at the time reflected the inter-
pretation Marshall later attributed to it. Marshall's reliance on
Madison certainly provides strong initial support for such a view.
Still, this view may also be incorrect. When Antifederalists such as
Patrick Henry fumed that the Constitution should be formed by
the state governments rather than "We the People of the United
States,"2"8 some Federalists responded with a "We the Peoples"
conception, Madison chief amongthem." Yet others, such as James
Wilson, appeared to justify ratification as an appeal to the people
of the nation.29 ° Many others, moreover, apparently confirmed
287. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
288. 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES 930 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare
Saladino eds., 1990) (Patrick Henry, Jun. 4, 1788) [hereinafter, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
289. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
290. Wilson asserted, in terms more clearly nationalistic than "A Friend to the Union" or
"A Friend of the Constitution:
His [William Findlay's] position is, that the supreme power resides in the
States, as governments; and mine is, that it resides in the People, as the
fountain of government; that the people have not-that the people mean
not-and that the people ought not, to part with it to any government
whatsoever.... I consider the people of the United States as forming one great
community, and I consider the people of the different States as forming
communities again on a lesser scale. From this great division it will be found
necessary that different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the
governments, according to the nature, number, and magnitude of their objects
.... I view the States as made for the people as well as by them, and not the
people as made for the States. The people, therefore, have a right, whilst
enjoying the undeniable powers of society, to form either a general government,
or state governments, in what manner they please; or to accommodate them to
one another, and by this means preserve them all.
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Antifederalist fears by greeting accusations that they understood
the Constitution to reflect something like Wilson's view with
silence. The creation myth as understood at the time of creation, in
short, may have been more nationalist than even John Marshall
recalled. At the very least, the original understanding may well
have been simply more complex, in a sense even contradictory, as
Monaghan suggests.29' Either possibility, however, must await
further study in a surprisingly understudied area.
Looking beyond Marshall, subsequent eras of higher lawmaking
almost certainly transformed the terms of constitutional creation in
any event. As Eisgruber has argued, the Civil War and the
Fourteenth Amendment effected changes that rendered "the most
plausible basis for the contractual view of the Constitution... as (at
least in part) the result of the 'voluntary acts' of state governments
or state peoples ... untenable."292 If so, it may be that the nation
recreated the Marshall it needed to keep pace with the more unified
conception of sovereignty it subsequently developed. Lost, however,
was a far more interesting figure no less useful or relevant.
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 288, at 472-73 (James Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787); cf.
Monaghan, supra note 13, at 152-53 (acknowledging that Wilson spoke nationalisticallywith
reference to the original ratification, but pointing out that he never expressly extended this
conception to Article V).
291. Monaghan, supra note 13, at 138-39.
292. Eisgruber, supranote 8, at7l. Eisgruberarguesthatthis change came aboutthrough
the Fourteenth Amendments identification ofpersonhood with United States citizenship and
reduction of state citizenship to a mere incident of residency. Bruce Ackerman has
alternatively argued that the Civil War and Reconstruction replaced the Founding's
federalism-based model of higher lawmaking with a more nationalistic process keyed to
federal separation of powers. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2WETHEPEOPLES: TRANSFORMATIONS 17-25
(1998).
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